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Abstract 
This thesis examines the South African electricity policy-making regime asking the question "What 
is the nature of South Africa's electricity policy regime and how does it act as a barrier to reform 
and the introduction of sustainable energy sources into the South Africa's energy system from 1994 
to 2011?" It hypothesizes that a policy regime that amounts to a coalition between energy intensive 
business, electricity utility Eskom and the Government that has developed in the post apartheid era 
out of what Fine and Rustomjee called the Minerals-Energy Complex. It hypothesizes that this 
regime uses its financiai and political power and skills asymmetries to ensure policy is made in a 
supply paradigm, which prefers cheap source of electricity supply to meet growing demand over 
efficiency and sustainability in the energy system and that this is the major barrier to reform. 
The thesis uses policy regime theory and policy paradigms to examine the problem, and uses a 
qualitative analysis of South Africa's energy policies, public energy hearings and policy 
implementation indicators, such as budget allocations, to establish the existing power relations in 
the electricity sector, the preferences of the most powerful players and to determine whether they 
act as a barrier to reform. The findings agree with the hypothesis in showing that there exists a 
powerful energy policy regime that amounts to a coalition between energy intensive business, 
Eskom and Government. It fin~s that this regime operates in a Supply paradigm that preferences 
cheap electricity supply over an efficient energy system. However, the thesis also fmds that there 
are two competing policy regimes, a second in the Supply paradigm that has a preference for 
nuclear energy in future capacity expansion and one in a SupplylDemand paradigm that preferences 
an efficient energy system that makes significant use of renewable energy sources. It makes the 
surprising discovery that renewable electricity producers do not form part of the SupplylDemand 
regime, preferring a system that preferences electricity over other energy sources, guaranteeing 
them a large market. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and overview 
In 1994, after South Africa's transition to democracy, the ANC government embarked on an 
ambitious program of electricity industry reform. The new government needed to deliver affordable 
electricity to all of its constituents who were neglected by the apartheid regime. 1 In order to do this 
policy-makers saw the need not only make new connections but also to reform distribution and 
production of electricity as well as introduce an electricity regulator to standardise and set 
electricity tariffs.2 
Despite the success of the government's mass electrification programme (it made over 3 million 
new connections in six years)3 and the establishment of the National Electricity Regulator in 1995 
(which became the National Energy Regulator of South Africa in 2002), reform of the electricity 
production and distribution sector has not progressed significantly from 1994, despite the 
development and adoption of a model for the restructuring of the electricity supply industry in 2003 
(this was postponed in 2004).4 
However, South Africa's democratic transition has put new strains on the energy industry. 
Economic growth and the ANC's mass electrification programme have increased demand for 
electricity above capacity. This has put South African electricity supply in crisis. Still, state owned 
Eskom remains the only significant electricity supplier,5 providing 98% of the country's electricity, 
generating 92% of this by burning South Africa's cheap and abundant supply of low grade coal. 
Eberhard, A (2007) The political economy of power sector reform in South Africa in Heller, T and Victor, 0 
(cds) The Political Economy of Power Sector Reform, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Pp 230 
2 Marquard, A (2006) Origins and Development of South African Energy Policy. Unpublished PhD Thesis, UCT. 
Pp 183-184 
3 Eberhard, A (2007) pp239 
4 Marquard, A (2006), pp 187 
Eberhard, A (2007) pp 230-235 
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This means South Africa's electricity, while still cheap, is some of the dirtiest and least sustainable 
in the world.6,7,8 Eskom no longer has the ability to create new capacity and maintain cheap prices 
and the Treasury does not have the reserves to provide finance for new power generation 
infrastructure. Increases in South Africa's generation capacity are therefore dependent either on 
private investment or debt.9 South Africa's electricity supply industry is in desperate need of reform 
in order to increase capacity and ensure sustainability. 
However, South Mrica's traditional economic strengths have been its energy intensive mining and 
related manufacturing sectors. 10 These industries depend on high energy inputs and in South Africa 
they have become dependent on the provision of cheap electricity. This occurred due to the 
industries' adaptation to low electricity prices in the 1980s derived from Eskom's over capitalisation 
and consequent excess capacity and cheap coal as fuel. The result is that mining and manufacturing 
industries have adopted methods that are electricity intensive and their competitiveness derives 
from electricity as a cheap input. II These industries and other groups interested in their success 
(such as the government, mining and metalworkers' unions) are therefore dedicated to ensuring the 
maintenance of a cheap supply of electricity. This reliance on cheap sources of electricity implies a 
preference for coal over other more expensive energy sources, ensuring the protection of Eskom as 
the producer of electricity and protecting industry from a rise in prices through private production. 
Eskom itself is unwilling to cede control of electricity production or transmission into private 
hands, squashing attempts to introduce competition into the market. It does this by refusing to sign 
6 Bond, P and Hallowes, D (2002) The Environment ofAoartheid CApitalism in Bond, P, Unsustainable South 
Africa, Environment, Development and Social Protest. University of Natal Press, Pietennaritzburg, pp 37. 
7 Marquard, A (2006) pp 122 
8 The government has recently been forced to halve its coal reserve figure due to updated calculations, 
suggesting South Africa may have hit the peak coal barrier. 
httj?://www.miningreview.comlConcernloverlaccuracy/SAlcoaVreserves 
9 Eberhard, A (2007) pp 223 
10 Fine. B and Rustomjee, Z (1996) The Political Economy of South Africa: From Minerals-Energy Complex to 
Industrialisation. Witswatersrand University Press, Johannesburg. Pp 71. 
11 Ibid pp108-111 
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long~term power purchasing agreements that would entice private firms to enter the market and by 
refusing to relinquish control of either the power production or transmission industries, either of 
which could provide the incentive for private firms to enter the market. 12 
Reform of the distribution industry has also stalled as local authorities, who derive significant 
revenues from electricity distribution, and the Treasury, who would like to see this continue, resist 
the transfer of this responsibility to proposed regional electricity distributors. 13 
The ANC, the main driver of reform in the electricity sector, has achieved its two primary goals for 
the electricity industry: the mass electrification of households to redress the racial imbalance in 
access to electricity created by apartheid and the creation of an electricity regulator (originally the 
National Electricity Regulator or NER, now the National Energy Regulator of South Africa or 
NERSA) to standardise and set electricity tariffs across the country.14 Subsequent to these 
successes, the political will to further reform the electricity industry has dissipated. IS 
The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to examine and explain the policy making arrangements and 
describe how reform has been resisted in the South African electricity supply industry between 1994 
and 2011, preventing the introduction of private players into the electricity supply industry and the 
adoption of sustainable electricity systems. 
The history and political eConomy of South Mrica's electricity sector 
The political economy of South Africa's electricity sector is best understood through the history of 
12 Greenberg, S (2008) Market liberalisation and continental expansion: The repositioning ofEskom in POst 
apartheid South Africa in McDonald, D (ed) Electric Capitalism: Recolonising Africa on the power grid HSRC 
Press, Cape Town. Pp 77-82 
I3 Marquard, A (2006) pp 187 
14 ANC (1994) Chapter 2, The Reconstruction and Development Programme: a policy framework. Umanyano 
Publications, Johannesburg. Pp 31-34. . 
1 S Eberhard, A (2007) pp 216 
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the development of the sector, its linkages to mining and manufacturing sectors and politics pre-, 
during and post-apartheid. It is also important to understand the political economy of South Africa's 
electricity sector in order to understand the development and power of its policy regimes. 
Electricity was flrst generated in South Africa by private companies as a resource for energy 
intensive gold mining. The nature of gold deposits in South Africa meant that their extraction was 
(and still is) both labour and energy intensive.16 Local authorities followed suit, beginning to 
establish small electricity systems to supply cities. The government established the Electricity 
Supply Commission (Escom, later Eskom) in 1922 to take over the responsibilities of supply to 
local authorities and to establish generation and distribution capacity for the lowest cost possible. 
Escom was mandated as (and continued to view itself as) a progressive driver of electricity and the 
eXPaIlsion of its supply as a means of progress. 17 
Up until the late 1940s, when it was expropriated by the government, the principle electricity 
producer for mining operation was the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company (VFTPC). It 
was the VFTPC's ability to produce electricity cheaper than the mines, through economies of scale 
and using the latest technologies, that established the monopoly character of the South Africa's 
electricity industry. IS The VFTPC, along with Escom, established coal as the primary resource for 
electricity in the country following its discovery in close proximity to the gold deposits and by 1930 
were producing electricity as cheaply as it was being produced anywhere else in the world. The 
expropriation of the VFTPC was motivated by the advantage of further economies of scale in the 
electricity sector, the need for capital to ensure the requisite investment to develop the sector, and 
justifled by the state-owned enterprise's ability to produce electricity at cost. Government 
16 Marquard, A (2006) pp67-69 
17 Ibid, pp 126-128 
1& Conrad ie, S and Messerschmidt, L (2000) A Symphony of Power: The &kom Story. Chris Van Rensburg 
Publications (Pty) ltd, Johannesburg. Pp 29-30 
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guarantees could ensure the capital was avai~able.19 
The establishment of Escom -- and its subsequent takeover of the VFTPC through the Electricity 
Control Board (the electricity oversight body established along with Escom in 1922) withholding 
renewals of licenses after Escom said it could provide the electricity more cheaply -- gave state 
ownership to the electricity monopoly and laid the foundation for the rise of what Fine and 
Rustomjee have called the minerais-energy complex (MEC}?O This began as the interdependence of 
gold mining, coal mining and state run electricity. The complexity of this relationship increased 
over time with the introduction of the other mining and manufacturing industries aimed at the 
benefitiation of mining products, such as the iron and steel industry, (including the state owned 
Iscor) the petrochemicals industry (through the state run Sasol) through the late 1950s, 1960s and 
the early 1970s. The introduction of these industries fonned part of the apartheid government's 
pursuit of industrialisation. The manufacturing industries included iron and steel benefitiation, 
smelting, the production of base metals and other chemicals, many needed for mining processes, 
and the petrochemicals industry, dominated by Sasol's production of crude oil from coal through the 
Fischer-Tropsch process. They are particularly electricity intensive industries and dependent on 
cheap electricity for profitability.21 New power stations were constructed close to the privately 
owned coal mines and by the 1980s Escom had capacity in excess of 10000 MW. Additionally, 
Escom at that time had new capacity in planning and construction of over 22000 MW, funded 
through local and international government bonds, in response to rapid demand growth as the 
country substituted oil with electricity in response to the oil shocks and embargoes of the 1970s.22 
During this period of state led industrialisation, ownership in the MEC was shared between private 





Eberhard, A (2007) pp218-219 
Fine, Band Rustomjee, Z (1996) 
Ibid, pp71-91 
Eberhard, A (2007) pp219 
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(which grew increasingly complicated as international isolation tightened) with some interests in the 
manufacturing sector. The state owned the electricity industry and other mining support industries 
such as the railways and ports. The state also drove the development of the manufacturing industry, 
owning significant parts of it. The private sector developed into a small number of large 
conglomerates as isolation limited opportunities for investment internationally. Holding companies 
owned mines and separate manufacturing firms that consumed the raw materials that their mines 
produced. Thus, there were extremely high levels of concentration of ownership on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange leading up to 1994 and the post-apartheid era.23 
The MEC was (and largely still is) the backbone of the South African economy. Fine and Rustomjee 
showed in 1996 that the combination of the mining sector, the mining related manufacturing sector, 
the petrochemicals sector and the electricity sector accounted for as much as 27,5% of GDP in the 
late 1980s, by separating out MEC related manufacturing from other manufacturing in the 
economy.24 The argument for understanding the MEC as a single block is a strong one, 
demonstrated through the fo~ard and backwards linkages in between its various sectors: over 90% 
of the coal it produces is consumed within the MEC, over 40% of electricity produced and over 
20% of the MEC's output forming almost 60% of its inputs.25 Viewing the MEC as a single block 
also partly explains South Africa's specific dependence on electricity and the reason Escom has 
been granted significant independence in the formulation of electricity policy with respect to 
generation capacity, transmission and finding effective ways to meet demand cheaply. 
The regulation and oversight of the South African electricity industry had been weak with respect to 
the state owned Escom.26 When Escom was established in 1922, the government established the 





Fine, Band Rustomjee, Z (1996) pp 98-103 
Ibid, pp 81 
Ibid, pp 81-85 
Marquard, A (2006), pp 129-133 
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responsible for licensing generation and approving the tariffs charged by electricity suppliers. It 
reinforced the government's preference for a state run electricity monopoly (as demonstrated by its 
refusal to reissue the VFTPC with licenses, leading to its takeover by Escom) and by refusing 
private players' licenses if Escom could beat their tariff. Beyond this, the ECB had little influence, 
having only 5 members and 2 staff.27 In 1985 the De Villiers Commission investigation into the 
governance of Escom resulted in its restructuring into Eskom. In 1987 the ECB was supplanted by 
the Electricity Council (BC), made up of ministerially appointed councillors representing major 
consumers, relegating the ECB to the role of regulator of private producers with Eskom no longer 
requiring licensing by law. The Electricity Council performed the role of government liaison: 
negotiating Eskom-sought price increases to fund investment in new infrastructure to acceptable 
levels for consumers, subject to approval by the minister. This arrangement persisted until the ECB 
was replaced by the National Electricity Regulator (NER) in 1995. The NER emerged out of the 
politically inclusive National Electricity Forum (NEF) which negotiated electricity issues through . 
South Africa's political transition. The NER took responsibility for all licensing of electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution, which once again included Eskom operations. It was also 
mandated with regulation and rationalisation of tariffs to local authorities and wholesale consumers, 
and as an oversight body. These functions were incorporated into NERSA in 2002. 28 
At a national departmen~l level oversight and regulation has also been very limited. Escom came 
initially under the purview of the Department of Mines and Industry, then the Department of 
Commerce and Industry in the 1930s before moving to the Department of Industry in the 1960s and 
then briefly to the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs in 1980. At the end of that decade it 
was moved to the new Office of Public Enterprises, which became a full ministry in 1994. The 
Department of Public Enterprises has been Eskom's principle shareholder since 1994, but Eskom 
has been accountable to the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (now the Department of 
27 
28 
Ibid, pp 133 
Ibid. pp 134 
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Energy). According to Marquard,29 none of these departments had capacity to oversee electricity 
policy until the late 1990s. This left Eskom mostly free to make electricity policy and supply 
decisions throughout its existence. 
Subsequent to South Africa's 1994 democratisation, the landscape of South Africa's political 
economy has changed substantially. The gradualliberalisation of capital controls has meant South 
African conglomerates have largely unbundled and sought investment overseas with outgoing 
foreign direct investment (FDI) greater than the much hoped for incoming FDI.3o Macroeconomic 
policy has been designed to incorporate World Bank structural adjustment programmes along with 
prudent fiscal and monetary policy.3l The immediate post-apartheid government prioritised the 
repayment of the country's debts built up during the economy's stagnation of the eighties, leaving 
little funding available for infrastructure development. 
Once in power, the ANC tempered its tendency towards socialism, implementing first the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme in 1994. This committed the new government to 
redistribution while enshrining Washington Consensus property rights and respect for structural 
adjustment. However, the ANC government became increasingly neo-liberal from 1996, under the 
influence of Vice-President Thabo Mbeki, implementing the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution Plan (GEAR). This prioritised growth over redistribution by aiming to reduce the 
budget deficit, control inflation, lower trade barriers and stabilise the currency.32 These policies 
have been coupled with some privatization of the apartheid born state industries (some successful, 
some not), with an apparent intention to privatize more, despite opposition from the ANC's socialist 
allies the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South African Communist 
29 Ibid, pp 143-156 
30 Fine, B (2008) The Minerals-Energy Complex is Dead: Long Live the MEC Amandla! Colloquium, pp2-5. 
http://eprints.soas.ac.ukl5617/ [accessed 01107/2011] 
31 Habib, A and Padayachee, V (2000) Economic Polis;y and Power Relations in South Africa's Transition to 
DemocracY in World Development 28, 2. pp 245-253. 
32 Handley, A (2005) Business. government and economic policymaking in the new South Africa. 1990-2000 in 
Journal of Modern African Studies 43, 2. pp 225-228 
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Party. Legislation has been passed to encourage black ownership in the economy. Despite these 
efforts, economic growth has been moderate -- hovering around the 3% for most of the period 
between 1994 and 2010 -- and foreign investment low, recruitment of which has been a major 
justification for the creeping neo-liberalism.33 The subsequent introduction of the Accelerated and 
Shared Growth Initiative in 2005 continued along in this vane, although it gradually expanded 
social and infrastructure spending as the benefits of the reduced budget deficit were felt, and began 
to examine the use of industrial policy to increase the growth rate. 34 
More recently the government has decided to use industrial policy as a means of encouraging 
economic growth. In 2007, the government released its National Industrial Policy Framework 
(NIPF), which, through thirteen strategic programmes, aims at creating skills and jobs to deepen 
South· Africa's industrialisation. It identifies the need to stem job losses in South Africa's 
commodities sect<.>rs, agriculture and particularly mining, and proposes the pursuit of further value 
addition through labour absorbing manufacturing including the beneficiation of minerals, thus 
deepening the electricity intensive manufacturing sector.35 The framework also emphasizes the 
importance of maintainin.g cheap electricity.36 The framework fails to address the energy 
implications of its goals, the additional requirements for deepening mineral manufacturing and how 
this will be addressed despite the economy already beginning to experience electricity shortfalls as 
of 200512006. The NIPF was followed by the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) in late 2007 
which set out the details and time frames of for NIPF's Key Action Plans. The IPAP identified four 
lead sectors for support and intervention: 1) equipment and metals, 2) automotive assembly and 
components, 3) chemical and plastic fabrication and pharmaceuticals and 4) forestry, pulp, paper 
33 Marais, H (2011) South Africa pushed to the limit: The political economy 0/ change. UCT Press, Cape Town. 
Pp 1481-49 
34 Ibid, pp 1481-49 
3S The Department ofTrade and Industry (2007) A National Industrial Policy Framework pp 9 
36 Ibid, pp 15 
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and furniture.37 The IPAP further deepens the NIPF's commitment to energy intensive 
manufacturing without addressing the energy and electricity implications of these choices. The plan 
does note the potential for a South African biofuels industry, but fails to address demand side energy 
and electricity concerns. The IPAP was followed in 2010 by the Industrial Policy Action Plan 
2010/11-2012/13, known as the IPAP2. The IPAP2 addresses industrial opportunities in response to 
the global recession, going deeper than the immediate interventions of the IPAPl. It addresses 
industrial finance, tariff and trade policy and competition policy as well as identifying areas for 
support and development. It identifies the same areas as the IPAPI but adds others, including 
tourism, business process outsourcing and green and energy saving industries. In terms of green and 
energy saving industries, the IPAP2 proposes changing building regulations and standards to ensure 
markets for local producers of energy saving products. It is primarily focussed on the potential of 
solar water heating as well as the potential of the solar power and wind industries.38 The plan, 
however, again fails to address the additional demand on the energy sector it will place, despite the 
experience of supply shortage. The plan also fails to address improved industry efficiency in a 
meaningful way, only acknowledging the need for it without detailing how this would be 
accomplished, then simply treating it as an area for potential new industrial growth. 
The most immediate effect of the transition to democracy on the electricity sector was the political 
imperative to equalise distribution to domestic users. Apartheid gave preference to white urban 
consumers of electricity over black peri-urban and rural users, leaving the latter without connections 
or basic electricity infrastructure. Local municipalities were the primary distributors of electricity to 
urban users, but Eskom agreed to take on much of the responsibility for making and distributing to 
new connections post 1994. Eskom has been fairly successful in terms of making connections, 
despite increasing restriction on the amount of government funding available. 
37 The Deparbnent of Trade and Industry (2007) Implementation of Government's National Industrial Policy 
Framework: Industrial Policy Action Plan. Pp 5 
38 Deparbnent of Trade and Industry (2010) 201012011-2012-2013 Industrial Policy Action Plan. Pp41-45 
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The second affect of the democratic transition and the subsequent fiscal restrictions of the new 
government's economic realities on the electricity industry was the increased pressure on state 
owned enterprises to run efficiently.39 This led to a restructuring of the oversight and management 
structure of Eskom, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
Up to the early 2000s it appeared that Eskom was performing well compared to other state owned 
enterprises; it provided amongst the world's cheapest electricity at a profit and with high labour 
productivity. However, this picture was misleading, as Eskom commissioned excessive supply in 
the 1980s and was able to maintain cheap supply only because it had no need to invest in new 
supply infrastructure, having paid off all existing supply infrastructure. It was able to supply 
electricity at marginal cost or below and still maintain a profit.4o By 2006, following several years 
of good economic growth, demand began to exceed supply and Eskom began rolling blackouts at 
peak demand times in the year or during power station maintenance schedules. 
Despite deciding to reopen several coal power stations previously 'mothballed' as a result of 
overcapitalisation, Eskom has been forced to commission new power stations to be financed 
through debt and increased electricity tariffs. NERSA has agreed to around 24% increases in tariffs 
each year for three years from 2010,41 the World Bank granted Eskom a loan of $3.75 million to 
fund the construction of two new coal-fired power plants,42 and the African Development Bank 
agreed to a $2.77 billion loan as a contribution to one of the two plants. Effectively, this ties South 
Africa into servicing long-term debt for two new power stations decided upon through old 
fashioned planning methods which deepen the country's dependence on coal powered electricity. 
39 Eberhard, A (2007) pp 231 
40 Ibid, pp 232 
41 NERSA, Reason for Decision: Eskom Holdings Limited: Revenue Application - Multi Year Price 
Detennination 2010/11 to 2012113 (MYPD2) available at htto:llwww.nersa.org.za/[accessed 15107/2011] 
42 MacNamara, W (2010) Big push to make sure the POWer stays on in Financial1fmes April 2010 pp3 
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The structure of South Africa's electricity supply industry 
South Africa's electricity industry structure is dominated by Eskom. The industry can be divided 
into three distinct areas: 1) production, 2) transmission and 3) distribution. Eskom functions in all 
three areas, producing over 98% of the country's electricity. It controls the electricity grid, and 
therefore maintains sole responsibility for buying electricity from independent power producers as 
well as providing distributors with supply. Distribution is handled by local municipalities in most of 
the country's established urban areas, with Eskom distributing directly to many of the rural and peri-
urban areas connected to the grid after 1994. Eskom is also responsible for the direct distribution to 
its largest consumers, members of the minerals-energy complex as well as other large agricultural 
users. 
Since 1994 there have been several attempts to alter this structure, to update the management of 
electricity supply in the country and allow for some privatisation of the industry in line with 
GEAR.43 These attempts have been most effective at the regulatory level, with the introduction of 
the NER and NERSA, but have failed in their attempts to change the structure of the industry. The 
National Electrification Forum (NELF), established to oversee the transformation of the electricity 
industry through the country's political transition, began preparing for the rationalisation of the 
electricity distribution industry prior to its disbandment in 1995. Its efforts were continued by the 
NER, which convened an Electricity Working Group (EWG) made up of government, 
municipalities, Eskom and the NER. The working group proposed to the Electricity Restructuring 
Interdepartmental Committee (ERIC), whose role was to make recommendations to Cabinet, that 
the distribution of electricity be divided under several independent Regional Electricity Distributors 
(REDs), wi~ the rationalisation process to be managed by publicly owned Electricity Distribution 
43 Eberhard, A (2007) PP ,231-235 
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Company. Cabinet agreed to this, deciding that there should be six REDs, and in 2000 appointed a 
PricewaterhouseCoopers led consortium to propose a model for the development of the REDs. This 
was overseen by the Electricity Distribution Industry Restructuring Committee, made up of Eskom, 
national and local government, which developed a blueprint for the process that was accepted by 
cabinet in 2001.44 However, despite the establishment of the EDI Holdings company and the 
registration of one RED, Cabinet in 2010, decided to shut down the distribution rationalisation 
process.45 
The Department of Public Enterprises, in its effort to restructure state owned enterprises, began in 
2000 the process of corporatising Eskom. This was formalised in the Eskom Conversion Act of 
2001, which normalised Eskom's status as a company, outlining shareholding arrangements, despite 
maintaining public ownership, and tax responsibilities. The Act outlined the path to ringfence the 
transmission of electricity from its production, removing Eskom dominance over both the 
production of electricity and control of the national grid, which sources supply, establishing distinct . 
companies to oversee each.46 This would allow independent power producers access to the market 
without depending on their main rival, Eskom, to buy their electricity. While the initial 
corporatisation of Eskom was legislated in 2001, the legislation to ringfence transmission and 
establish an independent system and market operator is still in the draft phases. The latter legislation 
has been the focus of resistance from the governmenfs labour allies. 
Research question 
My research therefore seeks to answer: What is the nature of South Africa's electricity policy 
regime and how does it act as a barrier to reform and the introduction of sustainable energy sources 
44 Ibid, pp 231-235 
4S Consulting Engineers South Africa (2010) Termination of the Electricity Distribution Industry. Available at 
http://www.cesa.co.za/node/1l7 [accessed 15/07/2011]. 
46 Eberharrd, A (2007) pp244-245 
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· into the South Africa's energy system from 1994 to 2011? 
The hypothesis is that the presence of an influential policy regime -- closely associated with the 
Minerals-Energy Complex and Eskom -- acts as a barrier to the necessary shift in policy paradigms 
that would lead to reform of South Africa's energy and electricity sector and increase its 
sustainability. This regime amounts to an informal coalition between Government, across several 
levels and departments, Eskom and energy intensive industry. I expect to find that this regime uses 
both overt and covert influences, financial power, information and skills asymmetries, a broad 
support base of investor and labour interests, and public pressure for cheap electricity to reinforce 
the energy and electricity policies. The regime subscribes to a policy paradigm that pursues 
measures to expand energy supply cheaply to meet growing demand, without regard to demand-side 
efficiency, resource availability and sustainability. This regime is supported by the government's 
neo-liberal approach to economic development and consistently overpowers competing regimes and 
paradigms that, while vocal in public hearings, lack broad-based or institutional support, capacity 
and financial power. 
Research Design 
This study is a desktop examination of public documents from public participations in the policy 
process. This study draws on the methods employed by Gila Menahem in her studies of Israeli 
water47 and education48 policy regimes and by Peter May and Ashley Jochim's49 in scrutinising 
homeland security policy regimes in the United States. This study looks primarily at documentation 
from public participation processes in the development of policy. This documentation is in the form 
47 Menahem, G (1998) Policy Paradigms. Policy Networks and Water Policy in Israel in Journal of Public Policy 
18,3. pp 283-310 
48 Menahem, G (2008) The Transformation of Hi &her education in ISrael sjnce the 1990s: The Role ofIdeas and 
Policy Paradigms in Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 21, 4. pp 499-
526. 
49 May, P, Jochim, A and Sapotichne, J (2009) Policy Regimes and Governance: Constructing Homeland Security. 
Paper prepared for lOth public Management Research Association Conference, Ohio State University, October 2009. 
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of public submissions from public parliamentary hearings for specific energy and electricity 
policies. One aim of this analysis is to establish who is participating in the South African energy 
policy process, into what paradigms their propositions fall, and the extent to which these 
propositions can be traced in the final policy documents. In addition, the study will trace the extent 
of the implementation of the policies to trace the influence of regimes beyond the public 
participation process. This will establish the ability of competing regimes to influence the policy 
process in the electricity sector, indicating the relative strength of the policy regimes over the South 
African electricity industry. 
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Chapter 2 
Policy Regime Theory 
Background to Policy Regime Theory 
Literature on how policy is made and changed has rapidly developed since the 1950s with the 
current emphasis resting on the importance of policy networks deciding which policy solutions 
are chosen for identified problems. Although the literature to some extent agrees that policy is 
decided by groups of actors representing different interests, there is relatively little consensus 
around how this happens. Most of the theory does not manage to encompass all the aspects of 
policy making and policy change in its models and frameworks. 50 
The literature is largely developed in the United States and the United Kingdom and is 
therefore primarily designed to understand the policy process in these countries, but many of 
these studies can be useful for understanding the policy process in other similarly designed 
constitutional democracies. 
Policy is usefully described as a ''web of decisions.,,51 Decisions relate to each other as both 
part of a succession of policies and a structure of policies whereby they are linked and built on 
one another. The idea of this decision web is useful in that it acknowledges that the policy 
process is not as rational as sometimes thought and described by the stages model. Most 
contemporary authors reject the idea that the policy process is a linear progression of 
identifying problems and building solutions to fit the problems, 52 but more likely the result of 
sets of ideologies and interests attaching their solutions to problems as they come along. 53 
so Wilson, C. A (2000) Policy Regimes and Policy Change in Journal of Public Policy 20, 3, pp 247-274. 
51 Ham, C and Hill, M (1934) The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State. St Martin's Press, New York. 
52 See: Wilson, Cohen, March and Olson, Kingdon, Smith. etc 
53 Kingdon,] (1995) Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. HarperCollins College Publishers, New York, 
pp 173. 
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The theory of a policy network emerges out of the idea of policy subsystems, which describes 
the enduring relationships between state actors and interested parties in the policy sphere. This 
is first described with the development of the idea of the "iron triangle" in Unites States 
politics, where it is argued that congressional committees, bureaucracy and interest groups 
form the three nodes of a triangle that determines policy in the US.54 These triangles were 
specific to specific policy areas such as transport or agriculture and excluded other potential 
participants from the policy process such as the executive and outside interest groups or 
interested constituencies. A similar idea of policy communities developed in the UK, which 
described the ongoing relationships between state agencies and interest groups. These theories 
were generalised to become the theory of policy networks, where participants in policy 
networks have enhanced possibilities to influence policy-making. This has become the 
dominant approach to the study of policy-making. 55 
Policy network scholars are divided as to the actors, membership and nature of these groups. 
Some scholars such as Kingdon56 argue that networks are made up of individuals or groups 
which are either experts in a given policy area or regular participants in the policy-making 
process. Others, such as Rhodes, Marsh and Smith argue that it is groups that are significant, 
either interest groups or state agencies. Smith argues that these groups are held together by 
mutual resource dependencies, making policy interactions strategic. Sabatier alternatively 
outlines a theory of advocacy coalitions, which compete for influence on policy-makers. These 
coalitions are made up of people from various belief systems who share the same policy 
beliefs. 57 The criteria for membership of a coalition, beyond sharing belief systems, are sharing 
knowledge and developing strategies cooperatively to increase capacity to influence policy. 
54 Jordan, A.G (1981) Iron Triangles. Woolly Corporatism and Elastic Nets: Images of the Policy Process in 
Journal of Public Policy 1, 1, pp 96; 
55 Konig, T (1998) Introduction: Modeling Policy Networks in the Journal of Theoretical Politics, 10,4. pp 387 
56 Kingdon, J (1995) 
57 Sabatier, P (1988) An AdvocacY Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented 
Learning Therein in Policy Sciences 21,213, pp 129-168. 
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Policy retains an inherent structure that has been variously defined and is important to note in 
the South Mrican context. This structure is defined as a policy framework, which can be seen 
either as a meta-policy (if used in a weak sense), policy ideology, or policy paradigms (if used 
in a strong sense).58 Following the work of Peter Hall this paper will use the term policy 
paradigm.59 Sabatier60 makes the distinction between "Deep Core Beliefs", "Near Core 
Beliefs" and "Secondary Beliefs". Deep core beliefs are the fundamental normative principles 
of policy elites such as economic liberalism; near core beliefs are the primary policy positions 
taken as result of deep core beliefs such as preference of the market over the state; secondary 
beliefs form the instrumental decisions based in on the deep and near core, such as no 
minimum wage. Change, therefore, can happen at several levels of policy with varying degrees 
of difficulty. Change in an instrumental policy only needs a change in secondary belief (or for a 
policy maker to cede ground in an area of policy). This is a relatively minor change and does 
not necessitate the change of fundamental beliefs. Continuing the example provided above, this 
would mean accepting a minimum wage. However, minimum wage is a relatively minor state 
intervention, and does not mean that in general a policy maker prefers state intervention in the 
market. A change in a primary policy position, ceding to a significant level of state intervention 
in the economy, for instance, necessitates a change in near core beliefs and even deep core 
beliefs of policy makers, this is much harder to achieve. If deep core beliefs are what inform 
policy frameworks then it follows that policy frameworks are much harder to change and much 
more stable than individual policies. 
Explaining policy change has been a focus of the public policy discipline in recent years and 
sa Marquard, A (2006) pp 14. 
S9 Hall, P (1993) Policy Paradigms. Social Learning. and the State: The Case of Economic Policy making in 
~ in Comparative Politics 25, 3 pp 275-296. 
60 Sabatier, P (1988) 
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there is little consensus in the literature on this issue.61 Wilson identifies four major strands in 
the literature which explain policy change: 1) policy process and decision making, 2) elitists 
and neo-Marxists, 3) post-modern and culture and 4) state-centric. He argues that none or few 
of these adequately cover the mUltiple dimensions of the policy change process and tend to 
focus specific elements.62 
Policy network explanations of policy change fall into the first of these schools. They argue 
that change in policy is a function of alterations of power arrangements in ,policy networks 
such as the decline of an itlterest group and the rise of another or changing political 
coalitions.63 Within this school there are a number of ideas about how policy change takes 
place. Some, such as Cobb and Elder,64 argue that change is instigated by events which place 
issues on the policy agenda as problems and how 'policy entrepreneurs' push through their, 
own solutions in the form of policy changes. Others, such as Kingdon, argue that it is a 
combination of timing and manipulation that allows these entrepreneurs to match their 
solutions to policy problems~ citing the example of the public transport lobby promoting their 
interests in response to mUltiple issues such as clean air and urban congestion.65 
Further, True, Baumgartner and Jones developed the idea of a punctuated equilibrium, which 
characterises public policy as experiencing long periods of stability with short moments of 
change and attempts to explain both this stability and change.66 The theory is based on political 
institutions and bounded rational decision making, while focussing on issue defmition and 
61 Wilson, C. A (2000) pp247. 
62 Ibid. pp 248 
63 Ibid, pp248 
64 Cobb, R and Elder, C (1983) Participation in American politics: the Dynamics of Agenda Building. John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
6S Kingdon, J (1995), pp 173-174 
66 True, J. L, Baumgartner, F, Jones, B (2007) Puntuated-Eguilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in 
Public Policvmaking in Sabatier, P (ed) Theories of the Policy Process, Westview Press, Colorado, pp ISS. 
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agenda setting.67 For them, issues rise and fall in the public discourse and policy is either 
changed or reinforced by this rise and fall of issues on the agenda. The theory rejects both 
incrementalism and global rationality, arguing that neither explains the observation that policy 
tends to change suddenly.68 By including limited attention span in government, sudden change 
makes sense, as described by bounded rationality and fluctuations on the issue. Changes then 
occur through the political institutions and multilevel decision making. However, this theory is 
limited to accurately describing policy change at the system's level and not specific policies. 69 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's advocacy coalition framework, rather, is targeted at 
understanding policy problems when goals conflict, which result in technical disputes with 
multiple players from multiple levels of government.70 The theory is based on three 
assumptions: 
1) at the macro-level: factors in the broader socioeconomic and political system influence the 
behaviour of specialists in policy subsystem, 
2) at the micro-level: the individual can be understood though social psychology and 
3) at the intermediate level: these can be aggregated into 'coalition networks'. 
The dependent variables therefore are belief and policy change, which occur through (internal) 
policy-oriented learning and external changes.71 
Advocacy Coalition Framework theory (ACF) argues that subsystems are made up of both 
individuals and groups, and emphasize the role of researchers in informing policy position in 
subsystems. The Advocacy Coalition Framework theory differs significantly from punctuated 
equilibrium theory in its conception of how decisions are made. Instead of using rationality as 
67 Ibid, pp 156. 
68 Ibid, pp 156 
69 Ibid, pp 179 
70 Sabatier, P and Wielder, C (2007) The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Innovations and Clarifications in 
Sabatier, P (ed) Theories of the Policy Process. Westview Press, Colorado, pp 189. 
71 Ibid, pp192 
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its basis, ACF argues that beliefs systems have a greater influence on which choices are made, 
suggesting 'a logic of appropriateness' and 'a logic of consequences' to understand positions is 
more appropriate.72 This is based on the assumption of the difficulty of changing normative 
beliefs. This also informs how actors view their opponents.73 
ACF offers a powerful tool for explaining policy change, particularly at the policy level. Its 
emphasis on belief systems however makes it significantly more difficult for the theory to 
explain abrupt changes of policy frameworks. 
Policy Regime Theory 
Policy regime theories of policy change attempt to offer a synthesis of the study of most of the 
aforementioned schools of thought, but with particular emphasis on punctuated equilibrium 
theories and ACF. Wilson develops a model drawing on regime theory in· the international and 
regulatory regime theory from the pluralist paradigm in international relations.74 He suggests 
policy regimes form around specific issues, not belief systems. He accounts for belief systems 
in terms of what influences policy, arguing that policy regimes consist of four dimensions. The 
first of these is its power arrangements, the second is the policy paradigm, which incorporates 
beliefs and defines the way policy problems are understood and it comes from the actors 
involved in the policy regime. The third is organisation within government and the fourth is the 
policy itself.7s 
Power arrangements, according to Wilson, are organised such that regimes are supported by a 





Ibid, pp 194. 
Ibid, pp 194. 
Wilson, C (2000) pp 257 
Ibid, pp 258 
28 
University of  Cape Town
groups benefiting from the policy. The source of the power of these interest groups to support a 
particular regime could come from number of sources: financial power, a broad support base, 
weak opposition, state support or participation, or a business-friendly state. 76 
Wilson describes the policy paradigm as the lens through which a policy problem and its 
solution are defined, incorporating assumptions about the causes of the policy problem, how 
serious it is, who is responsible for creating the problem, who is responsible for solving it and 
what the government's role in this process should be.77 It also takes into account the population 
affected by the policy. Wilson argues that the policy paradigm is established by intellectuals 
and researchers who build the discourse around policy problem, professionals who work with 
the policy problem, interest and pressure groups promoting a particular agenda and policy 
makers who interact with these players. 78 
The organisation within government is the third dimension of the policy regime. This refers to 
the structure of the government, its departments and decision making bodies, including 
parliamentary committees, and implementing bodies such as government agencies.79 
Regime change is instigated by stressors and enablers, normally represented by an external 
shock to the system, such as the fall of the Soviet Union. As a consequence of this shock, the 
policy regime will experience paradigm shifts, power shifts, a legitimacy crisis and 
. . I d I' h 80 organisatlona an po ICY c ange. 
Stressors and enablers create the conditions necessary for change in the policy regime. They 
76 Ibid, pp 257 
77 Ibid, pp 257 
78 Ibid, pp 258 
79 Ibid, pp 251 
80 Ibid, pp 262 
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stress organisational structures, highlight problems in policy regimes, create change in the 
power arrangements of promoters of various policy agendas and swell the numbers of those 
disaffected by problems in policy. Wilson draws on Cobb and Elder's understanding of ''trigger 
events", Sabatier's "external perturbations" and Jones' "external events". These events can be 
any event with consequences relevant to the policy issue, from international politics, to natural 
and human disasters, gradual demographic changes, political change, public scandal, economic 
crises and resource shortages.81 Stressors and enablers create the possibility for paradigm 
shifts, normally through increasing awareness of an issue, changing popular perceptions, which 
creates the need for regimes to change these paradigms. Examples include the change in 
paradigm of tobacco policy regimes, and how inflation and shifts in unemployment can affect 
economic policy regimes.82 
These paradigm shifts occur when stressors and enablers create conditions that undermine the 
dominant paradigm. Alternative paradigms often exist as alternatives or in direct opposition to 
the dominant paradigm, becoming the successors to the dominant paradigm when stressors and 
enablers undermine the dominant paradigm's credibility.83 Wilson argues that the changes in 
smoking and racial segregation regimes are examples of this.84 Peter Hall further establishes 
this process in his discussion of the shift to monetarist over Keynesian macroeconomic policy 
with the election of Margaret Thatcher's government. 8S 
Wilson argues that a paradigm shift amounts to the persuasion by intellectuals of other 
intellectuals that an alternative paradigm is valid and the subsequent popularisation of the new 
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If the change of paradigm results in a crisis of legitimacy for the established policy regime, the 
result is the potential for regime change. This occurs through the popular abandonment of the 
old regime and the exploitation, by political leaders, of the paradigm shift to create a new 
regime. Political leaders make attacks on the rationality of the current regime and promote the 
alternative using the media, removing the issue from the traditional policy arena to wider 
aUdiences.87 
With the loss of legitimacy in public perception, policy regimes experience power shifts. These 
shifts occur through defection, the collapsing of coalitions, the formation and dissolution of 
organisations and the formation and dissolution of sources of power (here, power can be 
financial or defined in terms of support base, or leadership changes in the state). For regime 
change to occur, the power shifts need to create power bases with the capacity to make 
organisational changes and change to policy implementation.88 
These changes in organisation and policy implementation constitute the final stage of policy 
regime change. The reorganisation of the policy process is the culmination of change in policy 
goals, paradigms and power arrangements and these changes can result in four types of regime 
change: 1) dissolution and recreation of a regime, 2) consolidation of an existing regime, 3) the 
internal reorganisation of an existing regime, or 4) the creation of a new regime. 89 
The dissolution and recreation of a regime is the reallocation of responsibilities from an old 
agency, representing the old policy goals, paradigm and power arrangements to a new one, 
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the amalgamation of several agencies, which existed under the old regime into one agency, 
incorporating the goals of the new regime. Internal reorganisation of existing regimes accounts 
for the adjustment of a regime to the new paradigm and power arrangements and the adaptation 
of existing agencies to meet the needs these arrangements. The creation of a new regime is the 
establishment of new agencies to deal with new issues sometimes the result of political 
changes in the state. 
The strength of this model is its ability to analyse policy change on multiple vertical levels and 
across multiple subsystems on specific issues, having drawn on a large portion of the literature. 
However, this yields a less distinct understanding of the concepts and definitions in the 
literature as they become increasingly flexible.9O The model is further hamstrung, and 
particularly in the case of South African electricity policy, by its narrow focus on agencies and 
institutions organised around specific issues. South Africa's electricity policy is horizontally 
broad, spanning subsystems and several issues. While the model offers guidance in integration 
of vertical determinants of policy change -- key in the South African case -- it is insufficient for 
understanding the horizontal nature of the South African case which involves multiple issues 
and multiple subsystems. 
Policy Paradigms and Paradigm Change 
It is clear that policy regimes are determined and underpinned by their paradigms and the 
power and institutional arrangements which support them and it is changes in these relations 
that determine regime change. Institutional arrangements and political economy of a policy 
area are sources of power. Policy paradigms are, however, more nuanced and therefore merit 
their own treatment. 
90 Wilson, C (2001), pp 272 
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This thesis focuses on the barriers to policy change, while policy paradigms are typically 
studied in terms of how and why they change. If policy paradigms are a significant factor 
underpinning policy regimes, it follows that such a study would be enhanced by an 
understanding of why policy paradigms change, and conversely why they may not change. 
Peter Hall's seminal work Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State91 discusses the 
nature of policy change in terms of orders of change and paradigm change in terms of social 
learning. For Hall, a policy paradigm is a "framework of ideas and standards,,92 specifying the 
policy problem as well as the objectives and policy tools used to address them. It is embedded 
in the policy area and difficult to critically examine from within the policy area. First and 
second order change represents incremental policy change and the development of new 
policies and policy instruments respectively. Third order policy change represents the change 
or switching of a policy paradigm. 
Hall argues that modelling paradigm change is difficult because of the nature of paradigms as 
being not wholly measurable. This is further complicated by the influence of different 
paradigms on their respective policy actors, on their views, arguments and data that they 
accept. Paradigm change is thus presented as a sociological process rather than a scientific 
process, as decisions to switch paradigms are only partially based on scientific evidence. 
Switching paradigms is firstly a function of mUltiple factors such as: scientific evidence for a 
specific paradigm and intellectual support for the new paradigm, institutional positions and 
political advantages of competing factions and their available resources. Secondly, it is a 
function of authority; paradigm's whose experts carry the greatest authority have the 
advantage, particularly in technical cases such as electricity. Thirdly it is a function of policy 
91 
92 
Hall, P (1993) 
Ibid, pp 279 
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experimentation and policy failure. 93 The terms of policy paradigms are changed to cover 
policy failures, however, this undermines the coherence of the paradigm; if the paradigm 
cannot account for failures, this gradually erodes its authority.94 The paradigm change ends as a 
new paradigm replaces the old paradigm, securing power over policy-making and policy-
making institutions. This causes the emergence of a new regime. 
This also means that policy made at time 0 has an effect on policy made at time 1, both 
incrementally and in terms of dramatic change through undermining the paradigm. 
Hall argues that the process that leads to paradigm change is one of social learning. Building 
on the work of Heclo,9s Hall finds that first and second order policy change are instigated 
through learning within the state. Hall further contributes to arguments made by Heclo and 
Skocpol,96 asserting that social learning does not contradict statist theories of public policy 
making, but that public policy is primarily made by experts working within state structures. 
However, Hall fmds that third order change is subject to social learning on the scale of the 
wider society and not within the state. First and second order change are driven through 
learning in state institutions by experts. Conversely, third order change is driven by political 
and societal forces --often by politicians and not experts. It is driven by the complex of 
political parties and interests groups and their representatives acting as mechanisms to pressure 
a shift in policy paradigms. These mechanisms will vary from case to case, but will include 
participants such as the media, business interest groups, civil society interest groups and 
opposition parties as well as state institutions. The mechanism works through its acquisition 
and exertion of political power. 97 
93 Ibid, pp (280) 
94 Ibid, pp (280) 
95 Heclo, H, (1974) Modern Social Politics in Sweden and Britain. Yale University Press, New Haven. 
96 Skocpol, T (1985) Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research in Evans, P et al (eds) 
Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
97 Hall, P (1993), pp 283-287 
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Hall, additionally, makes the point that the resistance to policy change is supported by the 
presence of a coherent policy paradigm as a means to resist societal pressure, allowing the state 
some autonomy. It is not until this paradigm can be undermined that one is likely to see policy 
change. 
The case for Policy Regime Theory in the study of South Mrican Electricity Policy 
Policy regime theory and policy paradigms are useful theoretical lenses through which to 
understand electricity policy in South Africa. Electricity policy in South Africa experiences the 
influences of multiple policy subsystems, across multiple actors, institutions, and issues. It is 
also subject to macroeconomic pressure and macroeconomic policy frameworks. These 
subsystems, influenced by these pressures clearly form a policy regime that uses its policy 
paradigm to resist reform in the electricity sector in preference to their own mutual and 
individual interests. This thesis hypothesizes the existence of an electricity policy regime based 
on a coalition of big business, Eskom and the Government. The divergence of the deep core 
beliefs of these interests means that applying ACF theory would be inappropriate. At the very 
least, an ANC led government will have differing deep core beliefs from big business, given 
the ANC's alliance with organised labour. Punctuated equilibrium theory does not demand the 
alignment of deep core beliefs, but its usefulness is limited to explaining systemic policy 
change, not paradigm change or specific policy change. Further it rejects incrementalism, 
which, as will be shown in the following chapter is a feature of South African energy policy. 
Policy regime theory does not demand that policy-making coalitions share deep core beliefs, 
but argues that it is the paradigm that is significant. This combined with the inherent 
incrementalism of South Africa's energy policy and the persistent links of policy in South 
Africa to overarching policy frameworks such GEAR and Asgi-SA means that policy regime 
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theory is the most appropriate choice for the study of South Africa's electricity policy. _ 
The use of policy paradigms to understand technical fields and particularly energy policy is 
also well established internationally such as in Barkenbus 98and Szarka,99 as well as in the 
South African case in Marquard 100 and Tyler. 101 The high importance of the policy paradigm in 
regime theory analysis makes regime theory a natural choice as a lens through which to study 
electricity policy. 
Building on de Oliveira and Girod,102 Marquardl03 identifies four abstract paradigms in energy 
policy, which can be extrapolated to electricity policy in the South African case. These 
paradigms outline the policy making and institutional capabilities of the policy regimes present 
in a given context. The first is Autarky, where policy is not integrated, and infrastructure 
industries are pursued independently of one another in order to supply resource for economic 
growth. There is little or no planning or regulation or even a policy process in Autarky's 
system; policy decisions are made in order to create supply to meet demand with little 
consideration of other factors, designing growth models to meet linear demand growth. 104 
The second paradigm is Supply which implies the development of an integrated approach to 
energy planning. There are two primary elements to the Supply paradigm: 1) government 
integrates its policy making to energy policy planning decisions, and 2) government develops 
organisational and research capacity for energy planning policy. The paradigm is solely 
98 Barkenbus, J (1982) Federal Energy Policy Paradigms and State Energy Roles in Public Administration 
Review 42, 5 pp 410-418 
99 Szarka, J (2005) Wind power. policy leaming and paradigm change in Energy Policy 34 pp 3041-3048 
100 Marquard, A (2006) 
101 Tyler, E (2009) Aligning South African energy and climate change mitigation policy. Energy Research Centre, 
University of Cape Town. Available at 
http://www.erc.uct.ac.za!Researchipublications/09Tyler Policy alignment.pdf [accessed 2106/2011] 
102 De Oliveira, A and Girod, J (1990) Energy diagnosis: Toward a poJicy-oriented approach for energy planning 
in develQping countries in World Development, 18,4, pp 529-538 
103 Marquard, A (2006) pp 54 
104 Ibid, pp 56-58 
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concerned with the supply of energy to meet demand. Beyond temporary demand constraints in 
the face of supply shortages, it does not address demand side or other factors. It uses economic 
rationality to plan measures to supply aggregated demand at the cheapest possible price 
through econometric modelling. 105 
The third paradigm is the SupplylDemand paradigm. New pressures on the energy sector 
stemming from the falling of economies of scale and rising costs of increasing supply --
originally experienced during the oil shortages of the 1970s and environmental factors -- force 
policy makers to consider arrangements in the energy system and not only the energy supply 
sector. The energy system is the network of energy use from production through its 
transformations to its end use. Policy measures now affect demand as well as supply and policy 
makers strive for efficiency over energy conservation in supply crises. Demand no longer 
solely determines energy policy. 
The SupplylDemand paradigm comes in a weak and a strong form. The weak form simply 
introduces demand into the policy equation; the strong form focuses on the end use of energy 
to work backwards to find the best system to achieve that end. Successful adoption of this 
paradigm demands institutional expansion beyond research, data collection and planning 
capacity. Building institutional capacity in all aspects of the system that are capable of 
instituting change -- from electricity production to industrial regulations to building standards 
and appliance efficiency - is necessary. This expands the role of additional areas of 
government in developing policy interventions and broadens the state's means of addressing 
energy problems, but also increases the complexity of doing so. 106 
Marquard's final paradigm is the Structural/Cultural. This paradigm has thus far not 
lOS Ibid, pp 58 
106 Ibid, pp 58-60 
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experienced in any energy regime; it is influenced by complex challenges to energy systems, 
such as global warming, energy poverty and resource shortages. The Structural/Cultural 
addresses the relationship between society and energy, not only the energy system. It 
approaches policy in terms of energy services, as the end purpose of energy production, house 
warmth over electricity. It incorporates non-energy solutions to traditional problems, such as 
passive solar heating for houses and energy efficient construction practises. It represents a 
cultural change in a society's approach to energy, emphasizing design change over technical 
change. This final paradigm is typified by institutional decentralisation, with an increased need 
for sensitivity to local conditions, and mergers between energy specific institutions and 
institutions from other increasingly related policy areas, such as water affairs. 107 
Tyler argues that South Africa's energy policy up until 1998 has, on paper and in action, been 
informed by the Supply paradigm, but subsequent to 1998, has on paper tended toward the 
SupplylDemand paradigm. Despite having policy documentation intent on having a policy that 
would increasingly fit into the SupplylDemand paradigm, with multiple proposals seeking 
efficiency in the system, there is little evidence to suggest an intention to implement that 
policy. Thus, there has not been a genuine shift in policy paradigms in the South African 
electricity sector. lOS 
107 Ibid, pp 60-61 
108 Tyler, E (2009) pp 8-13 
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Chapter 3 
South Africa's Electricity Policy Regime 
The presence of an electricity policy regime and its terms need to be established before using policy 
regime theory to understand barriers to change in South Africa's electricity policy. Understanding 
who makes electricity policy in South Africa and analysing the policies produced helps determine 
the power arrangements, paradigm, organisation and policy of the regime itself. In order to achieve 
this determination, this chapter will examine three critical policy documents: 
• The 1998 White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa (and the 
subsequent Eskom Conversion Act of 200 1); 109 
• the 2003 White Paper on the Renewable Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa 110; 
and 
• the Integrated Resource Plan 2010-2030111 (in the context of related policies such as the 
White Paper on climate change and the Integrated Energy Plan). 
There are several reasons for this particular selection of policies 
: a) they cover a 13 year period between 1998 and 2011, which allows for tracing regimes and 
paradigms over time; b) they all address issues that open opportunities for increased sustainability 
in the South African energy system and electricity in particular, which will show how regimes can 
act as a persistent barrier to sustainability; c) they represent policy measures that are significant to 
all interests in the energy and electricity sector, from business, multiple levels of government, 
Eskom, consumers, independent power producers (IPPs) and sustainability activists. 
The White Paper on Energy Policy 
109 Department of Minerals and Energy (1998) White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa 
110 Department ofMineraIs and Energy (2003) White Paper on the Renewable Energy Policy of the Republic of 
South Africa 
III Department of Energy (20 II) Integrated Resource Plan for Electricity 2010-2030 
39 
University of  Cape Town
The 1998 White Paper on the Energy Policy was developed in response to the country's changing 
political environment both internationally and domestically, and changed conditions in energy 
demand and supply possibilities. I 12 These changes include the end of international oil embargoes 
toward the end of Apartheid and the need to address energy poverty, particularly in rural areas, for 
those excluded by the Apartheid government. The white paper was formulated out of responses to 
the Ministry of Mineral and Energy Affairs Energy Policy Discussion document, of which there 
were in excess of 100. The white paper was primarily driven by the government, particularly the 
Department of Public Enterprise, which sought to normalise the structure of Eskom, in the name of 
corporate transparency and efficiency. The white paper was also driven by a broader government 
support for improved efficiency, as described in the GEAR macroeconomic plan, and supported by 
business seeking to ensure low cost electricity. Eskom also supported the plan, but only to the extent 
that it did not damage its control over the electricity industry. I 13 
The white paper laid out five primary objectives: 1) increasing access to affordable energy services, 
2) improving energy governance, 3) stimulating economic development, 4) managing energy-
related environmental impacts and 5) securing supply through diversity. I 14 With respect to each of 
the policy objectives, the white paper prioritised the following for the electricity sector: 
1) developing a policy for electrification of households, including planning and financing; 
improve energy delivery to households, including electrification; standardise the approach to 
both in and off grid electrification. 
2) Improving government's capacity to govern the energy sector, improve the policy 
formulation process; promulgate a new regulatory bill to consolidate the electricity 
regulatory regime. 
3) Appoint an authority to oversee the restructuring of the electricity distribution industry. 
112 Department of Minerals and Energy (1998) pp 17 
1I3 Eberhard, A (2007) pp 246-247 
114 Department of Minerals and Energy (1998) pp 23-27 
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4) Monitor the effect of electrification on the number and severity of fires caused by candles 
and paraffin. 
5) Develop the Southern African Power Pool to the mutual benefit of all of its members.115 
In terms of industry, mining and commercial demand the white paper commits the government to 
promoting energy efficiency and developing 'holistic' energy programmes for the sector. This was 
despite government wariness of regulating energy efficiency and sustainability out of fear of 
sending 'inappropriate economic signals,' a 'lack of access to efficient technologies,' the need to 
ensure a high return on investment and 'the high cost of capi~l' . 116 It also commits the government 
to ensuring standards of reliability and quality of supply in the electricity industry, and developing a 
database of energy demand, available to the public. 
In terms of interventions affecting the electricity industry on the supply side, the white paper makes 
prescriptions across the sector aimed at improving social equity, ensuring efficient, low cost, high 
quality electricity to industry and mining and environmental sustainability in the use of resources. 
This, the white paper argues, could be achieved through the rationalisation of distribution, the 
introduction of competition and the private sector.117 The white paper commits the government to 
the following: 
1) Consolidating distribution through the establishment of independent regional 
electricity distributors, owned by government and controlled by the private sector. 
This would be achieved through a transition where Eskom and municipalities 
participate in the separation of distribution form other functions and services 118 
2) Ensuring transparent and cost reflective tariffs and transparent funding for 
liS Ibid pp 27·28 
116 Ibid pp 34 
117 Ibid, pp 42 
118 Ibid, pp 44·45 
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3) Establishing policies for differential pricing for industries based price sensitivity for 
competitiveness 120 
4) Coordinating the electrification programme and differentiating between connections 
from new developments and the reduction of the backlog121 
5) Implementing legislation to realise universal household access to electricity 
gradually through the use of rolling targets 122 
6) Using integrated resource planning methodologies in evaluating further electricity 
supply investments and decommissioning old power stations123 
7) Encouraging the introduction of competition into the generation market, with 
mUltiple players 124 
8) The long term restructuring of Eskom into separate generation and transmission 
companies 125 
9) Legislation for open access of uncommitted transmission line capacity, managed by 
Eskom, with cost and pricing information supplied to the NER 126 
10)Sound governance of the electricity supply sector for the development of the 
electricity supply indUStry127 
ll)Consolidating the electricity sector regulatory regime, establishing the powers and 
functions of the National Electricity Regulator and guidelines on its regulatory 
philosophy and approach. 128 





Ibid pp 53 
Ibid, pp 54 
Ibid, pp55 
Ibid, pp 55 
Ibid, pp 57 
Ibid, pp 57 
42 
University f  Cape T wn
electricity policy challenges. 129 
In tenn of the power arrangements, it is clear that the government and Department of Public 
Enterprises were the dominant force in the policy process, and this was supported by the economic 
power of business. However, Eskom's ability to resist much of the refonn called for in the 
development of the policy -- particularly the devolution of 30% of its production capacity to private 
hands130 -- demonstrated that it too holds significant power within the regime. Applying Marquard's 
theory of energy policy paradigms, we see that this policy falls into the Supply paradigm, with some 
weak elements of the Demand/Supply paradigm. It is dominated by concerns for ensuring supply 
and expanding supply to meet demand, safeguarding economic development. It pays lip service to 
concerns about the environment and sustainability in South Africa's ,energy and electricity policy, 
particularly by proposing the development of renewable energy sources in the medium tenn and the 
adoption of integrated resource planning methodologies. 131 But it falls short of specific demand side 
interventions or institutional developments, focussing rather on the collection of infonnation to 
assess viability, with the condition that increasing costs, which could threaten the further 
development of established industry are avoided. It continues to mandate the supply of energy, 
particularly electricity to industry, mines and commerce at cheap prices to ensure economic growth. 
The white paper does recognise the need for efficiency in commercial agriculture. The policy's 
approach to energy efficiency measures, only prescribes research (or simply data collection) into 
efficiency possibilities, making it arguably a weak version of the third paradigm. While it expresses 
concerns for efficiency and environmental damage, its primary demand side focus is on providing 
alternative sources of household energy for rural dwellings, primarily electrification to replace 
wood, coal and paraffin.132 The white paper is largely focussed on electricity as the source of 
energy, with relatively little attention paid to the end use of energy, and efficient means of achieving 
129 Ibid, pp 57 
130 Eberhard, A (2007) pp 247 
131 Department of Minerals and Energy (1998), 28-29 
Ibid, pplO-ll 132 
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that end use. An exception to this is in the case of rural households, where the inappropriateness of 
electricity is considered; however this amounts to a relatively small amount of South Africa's 
energy consumption. 
With respect to the objectives of the white paper, successes have been limited. The government 
achieved its objective of widespread access to electricity. It provides a limited amount for free but 
this is not enough to heat and cook for a household, only enough to provide lighting and causes an 
increase in energy expenditure if consumers make decisions to switch cooking methods. 133, 134 
Prices over and above this amount have increased significantly.135 Neither security of energy 
(specifically electricity supply), nor supply diversification have been achieved; the country remains 
heavily reliant on coal for energy and electricity, with supply often interrupted. 136 Structural reform 
of the electricity distribution industry has been abandonedl37 and structural reform of the electricity 
supply industry has been slow, with little action to date, beyond the statements of intent to phase in 
independence of the transmission grid and allow private producers to enter the market. 138 The 
adoption of integrated resource planning methodologies has been limited, with old-fashioned supply 
forecasting still the predominant tool, as demonstrated later in this chapter. Governance has been 
improved with the introduction of the NERSA, but little has been done to mitigate the energy 
sector's environmental impact. Changes challenging the supply regime have therefore been 
133 Davis et at (2008) The Impact of Free Basic Electricity on Energy Choices in Low Income Households: A Case 
Study in South Africa. PESD working paper #80 available at bttp:Uiis-
db.stanford.eduipubsl223311WP 80. Davis Hughes Louw. FBE in South Africa.pdf [accessed 16/09/20llJ pp 
II 
134 Malzbender, D et at (2005) Domestic Electricity Provision in the Democratic South Africa. Paper produced for 
the Nordic Africa Institute's Conflicting Forms of Citizenship Programme. available at 
http://www.acwr.co.za{pdf fileslO1.pdf [accessed 16/09/20 111 




5%20June%202009.pdf [accessed 16/09/20 II] 
136 Eskom (2006) Multi-Year Price Determination of Eskom from I April 2009 to 31 March 2012: First 
Consultation Paper. Available at 
http://www.nersa.org.zalAdmin/DocumentlEditorlfilelElectricitylConsultationlDocumentslEskom%20MYPOO1020A 
~ril%2020090,1,20-%20March%202012.pdf[accessed 16/0912011] pp 13 
37 Hartley, W (2010) Government shuts regional POWer distributors in Business Day 0911212010 available at 
http://www.businessday.co.zalarticlesiContent.asox?id=129092 [accessed 16/09/20 II] 
138 Department of Energy (2011) Independent System and Market Operator Establishment Bill 
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ineffective. There has been limited legislation for the provisions in the White Paper. The limited 
action came primarily in the form of Eskom Holdings Limited by passing the Eskom Conversion 
Act of 2001 and the National Energy Act of 2008. The Eskom Conversion Act fails to make the 
necessary changes to the electricity market that White Paper proposes to create competition in the 
industry. Instead, it maintains a full or majority government shareholding over Eskom and Eskom 
Holdings and legislates Eskom's continued maintenance of universal access to affordable 
electricity.139 The National Energy Act legislates the creation and maintenance of the South African 
National Energy Development Institute (SANEDI), to research and maintain accurate energy data in 
term of supply and demand. This Act also includes the use and production of periodic Integrated 
Energy Planning and Integrated Resource Planning. The terms of these methodologies are not 
specified, and are legislated to take into account economic viability and developmental concerns 
without legislating any energy efficiency measures. 140 
The White Paper on Renewable Energy Policy 
The 2003 White Paper on Renewable Energy Policy was prepared as a supplement to the 1998 
Energy White Paper. It sought to set out the government's goals and policy principles as well as the 
methods of achieving them for the implementation of renewable energy in South Africa. This white 
paper was also intended as an information source for the public, international community and 
organs of state on these goals, principles and methods as well as the roles of the organs of state in 
implementing them. It outlines the government's vision for the role of renewable energy as an 
increased and affordable share of energy consumed and accessed throughout the country, in support 
of sustainable development and environmental conservation.141 




Eskom Conversion Act (200 1), pp 3 
National Energy Act (2008), pp 9-10 
Department of Minerals and Energy, 2003, pp 1. 
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institutional arrangements of its energy sector, including constraints to the incorporation of 
renewable energy sources into the sector. It outlines the constraints to incorporating renewable 
energies into the sector as: 
• high costs, particularly of capital; 
• high initial investment requirements; limited consumer awareness; 
• an economic and social system based on centralised systems and conventional energy, 
particularly electricity; 
• financial, legal, organisational and regulatory barriers; 
• a lack of open access to energy infrastructure, particularly the national electricity grid; 
• and the dominance of utilities. 142 
It examines renewable energy options including wind, biomass, bagasse, hydro, solar, wave and 
tidal energy, and options for establishing renewable energy power plants, noting the constraints of 
the centralised nature of South Africa's energy services system and its specific dependence on 
electricity. It specifically identifies solar water heating, landfill gas, biomass and biofuels,· small 
scale hydro, solar and wind electric technologies as having potential in the short term, with longer 
term options including tidal, wave and ocean current and hydrogen fuel cells.143 
The white paper also commits the government to a number of measures. Specifically, these 
measures are: 
1) Encourages Research and Development into cost-effective energy storage including 
renewable energy systems as well as the promotion of the local manufacture of renewable 
energy technologies. 144 




energy consumption by 2013, primarily through renewable electricity generation options, 
Ibid pp 9-10 
Ibid, Pp 24 
Ibid, pp 24 
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but also through solar water heating and the use of bio-fuels. 145 
3) Supports an economic efficiency based programme for the introduction of renewable energy 
with continued and sustained growth, and that allows government to measure and control 
support of it. 146 
4) Supports and facilitates the dissemination of information and training to encourage 
participation in the renewable energy market by both the private and public sector. 147 
5) Will make thermal efficiency a requirement for the awarding of housing subsidies and will 
develop appliance efficiency standards and enforce labelling. 148 
6) Ensures the incorporation of empowerment into government supported renewable energy 
projects. 149 
7) Grants the Department of Minerals and Energy overall responsibility for the coordination of 
renewable energy policy in the country in collaboration with related institutions and 
Government Departments. ISO 
The white paper, as an offshoot of the 1998 white paper, was again driven primarily by the 
government, through the Department of Minerals and Energy. However, low levels of 
implementation suggest that it did not have wide support throughout the paradigm, suggesting 
significant levels of power within the regime for those without specific interests in the renewable 
energy white paper. Energy-intensive business and particularly Eskom are suspicious of the 
implications of widespread renewable energy adoption, and have to a large extent limited its 
implementation, suggesting significant power within the policy regime. 
Again, applying Marquard's paradigms, this policy would fall into the second supply paradigm. It 
145 Ibid, pp 25 
146 Ibid. pp 29 
147 Ibid, pp 32 
148 Ibid. pp 31" 
149 Ibid, pp 39 
\So Ibid, pp 41 
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focuses almost exclusively on finding ways of integrating renewable energy into the existing energy 
and specifically electricity system. This neglects addressing demand side issues, focussing primarily 
on ways to increase electricity supply, by incorporating renewable energies, to meet growing 
demand. Third paradigm energy policy making demands the use of least demand side mitigation (in 
the weak sense) and the consideration of end use of energy before the supply choice is made (in the 
strong sense). There is little consideration of end use appropriateness in the White Paper, with a 
preference for simple partial substitution of electricity supply. There is some demand side 
intervention (requiring improved efficiency in government subsidised housing, and the promotion 
and subsidisation of solar water heating in new buildings and households) but this is minor in 
comparison to simply finding renewable supply mechanisms to provide electricity to households 
and industry. Despite advocating research into the inclusion of environmental costs into energy 
accounting practices, the White Paper advocates incentives for the minimisation of electricity 
costs. lSI This further anchors the policy in the Supply paradigm, ensuring supply based solutions to 
maintain low cost for the sake of economic rationality. Additionally, the policy makes no call for 
demand side intervention in the county's electricity intensive industries (beyond the installation of 
solar water heaters) and warns of the potential economic impacts of demand side mitigation and 
energy efficiency programmes.1S2 
In terms of action, there has been little response to this policy. Its implementation plan has not been 
developed. No further progress is likely before the finalisation of its mid-term review (which was 
due at the end of the first quarter of2011, but as of September 2011 has not been released, despite 
the fact that it is needed to inform the IRP2010, which has already been promulgated). It seems 
unlikely that 10000 GWh in renewable energy will come online by 2013. The use of solar water 
heaters is below 2% of the potential market with only some 77 000 installed, and this is primarily 
lSI 
IS2 
Ibid, pp 27 
Ibid, pp 36. 
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· I dri 153 pnvate y, not government, ven. 
Further, the 2003 White Paper, in line with the 1998 White Paper, seeks to introduce private 
electricity producers into the generation market. This is to allow for the private generation of 
renewable electricity in an efficient and competitive way. As of 20 11, significant barriers to entry 
remain for independent power producers. The Independent System and Market Operator has not yet 
been established meaning that IPPs are still relying on Eskom to purchase their electricity. NERSA 
has established a Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff. This tariff creates a facility for the purchase of 
privately produced renewable energy (minimum plant size of 1 MW) at a price higher than would 
be paid for coal power. This is to incentivise production of, and to establish a market for, renewable 
electricity. Having set varying tariffs for varying types of renewable electricity in 2010, in June 
2011 NERSA reduced the tariffs, despite not having implemented any power purchasing 
agreements. This has created further uncertainty and reluctance to invest amongst IPPs. 
Additionally, there is limited commitment to sign the long-term power purchasing agreements 
necessary to ensure the v.iability of IPPs in the market. 154 Therefore, there is a lack of political will 
to drive the introduction of renewable energies, given the lack of action since 2003 despite the 
rollout of plans for new electricity capacity and the slow reform of Eskom. This suggests that the 
dominant electricity policy regime is resistant to the efficiency regulations and renewable sources, 
preferring existing suppliers and methods. 
The Integrated Resource Plan for Electricity 2010-2030 
The purpose of the Integrated Resource Plan was to outline the build fleet for South Africa's 
electricity industry for the period 2010 to 2030. The plan is to be reviewed every two years for the 
twenty year period and seeks to determine the best build mix for new power generation methods 
1S3 TroUip, H et al (2010) Prospects for renewable energy in South Africa published by Heinrich Boell Stiftung 
Southern Africa available at http://www.boeII.org.za/web/climate-change-614.html[ accessed 13/09/2011] pp 4. 
IS. Ibid 
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and plants. It was developed through a repeated consultation process, considering multiple packages 
of potential new generation capacity. However the plan' was drafted by the Department of Energy's 
(DOE) technical task team consisting of: 
• four representatives from the DOE 
• two from Eskom, 
• five from members or major shareholders of Energy Intensive User Group members, 
• one from the Chamber of Mines, 
• an academic, 
• an Eskom-linked energy consultant, and 
• one representative from the South African Independent Power Producers' Association. 
This demonstrates the power government, Eskom and energy-intensive users have over the policy 
choices in developing the IRP2010. 
The government adopted the plan's Revised Balanced Scenario, developed after public consultation 
and seeking to achieve a balance of government's objectives in the face of a series of constraints. 
The government's objective in developing the IRP are stated as expanding supply side capacity to 
meet long-term future electricity demand, incorporating demand mitigation as well as supply side 
interventions. It focuses exclusively on the electricity sector, informing but not integrating with 
other energy plans. ISS It lists the constraints as: I) reducing carbon emissions; 2) uncertainty with 
new technologies, of costs, lead times and operability; 3) restricted water usage; 4) the need to 
localise and create jobs; 5) Southern African regional development and integration; 6) the need to 
ensure security of supply. IS6 
Through the evaluation of several possible scenarios (given expected growth in electricity demand 
ISS Department of Energy, (2010) Integrated Resource Plan for Electricity Draft pp 2-3 
IS6 Department of Energy, 2011, pp 7 
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, 
up until 203 .. ). the plan adopts the polic:, adjusted revised balanced scenario. Each scenariu was 
evaluatoo in terms of water usage, cost and impact on future electricity prices. climate change 
mitigation, levels of risk and uncertainty incorporating diversity of supply. its contribution (0 
lucalisation and its contribution to regional development. 117 This scenario cl}mmits the gl}vcmment 
to the following interventions in the eI~ctricity ~ector: 
• Selecting a mid -Ieyel option emission constraint of275 million tons by 2025; 
• the cunstruction of9.6 OW new nuclear capacity: 
• placing nu limits on the import of cuai. and coal and hydro electricity from neighbouring 
countries; 
• limiting Energy Efficiency Demand Side Manag~mcm ;nl~rvemion, to 3.42 GW by 20 I 7 
and the same until 2030.' '' 
The plan further commits tl) building new generatil}n capacity from the fo[lowing sources in Table 
I 
Table 1 
.'Ir.W BUILD CAPACITY' 
Coal (d Ci\\' 
1m porfed Ilyd ro dcctricity ".6 (;\\ 
Combined cyclc ~as turbincs (CCGT) ".4CiW 
I'cnj.; oren QTI,' g"s turbines (OC(;TI 3.9 CiW 
Combined Renewabk SOIl!'C('S (phutl}-vuitarir I H (j\\' (~.4 (W( 
'0131". cI}nc"ntnllcd solar [)(I'Hr. wind power) 
This is in addition to the already cummined listed in Table 2: 
'" 
'" '" 
Ibid. pp 26-27, 
Ibid. pp 11 _12 
Tbid.ppTS 
----~ 
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Table 2 
PREVIOUS COM\llTi\I.:~TS CAPACITY 
Keturn to S"niee C~p'lCit) lncommi~sioning 1.463 GW 
of "mothballed" coal'nnwer ,fa ti,,,,_,) 
Mcdupi Coal PowerPhlnl 4.332 CiW 
,",u_,He Coal P,,,,'cr Plaat 4.33~ G\,' 
POlllped Storage U32GW 
1lic~cI Op"" Cyck (;01s Turbine., 1.020GW 
Wind n.7 GW 
Solar n_~ CiW 
Landfills OI2SCi\v 
Olher sOurCe, (Ui Ci\V 
Thi, plan incroas~, lotal ekclricil,.,. ,uppl) fr00l44535 MW in 2010 10 89532 MW in 2030 to meet 
demand ",heh i, expecled 10 ri,e from 38885 MV': in 2010 to 67809 MW in 203o_1,1 
Eig~t a lternati\'~ sc~narios wer~ considered and assessed in terms of I~e described criteria which 
w~re weigfmd approximat~I,.,. 22% towards cost, 22'Y, to COl emissions reduclion, II % towards 
wmer usage reduclion. 20"/0 towards risk and unc~rtainty, 15% towards localisation potential and 
II % towards eontrih"tion to regional <kvdopmenL T1-..: ,cenarios included a base case option. 
which amo unts to a continuation of currem power >ouree pattern<: this scenario scored the best 
mark< for cost. They included three reduced emission ,c~nario,. one has~d on an i"'m~diate 
reduction to below 275 million ton pt;r year emission target (eff~ctively by 2(18). one based on a 
r~duction to below 275 million tons per year by 2025. one based on a reduction of emission to 
b~low 220 million tons by 2020, of which lhe \t;cond was the mo,t cost effective. The third was the 
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savings. 162 They included a carbon tax option, which scored second worst of all the scenarios for 
cost. A regional development focussed option scored second highest for cost effectiveness but very 
low in all other criteria except for regional development. An enhanced demand side mitigation 
option based on the base case scored highly in terms of cost, low in terms of in other areas and 
comparatively low in terms of risk and security. A balanced scenario scored second best overall, 
behind the first emissions scenario, performing well in all areas except water usage and regional 
development. Subsequently, this last scenario was revised and scored highest overall, scoring 
particularly high in cost, regional development, risk and localisation, but only placed fourth with a 
middling score on reducing C02 emissions, and fourth with a fairly low score on water usage. 163 
This revised balanced scenario was adopted in early 2011. 
Power in making electricity policy clearly still lies with government, Eskom and Energy Intensive 
industry through their privileged access to the policy writing process in the technical task team. In 
terms of the Marquardian paradigms, the IRP 2010·2030 again represents an example of policy 
making within the Supply paradigm, with some elements of a weak SupplylDemand paradigm. The 
stated focus of the plan is to ensure electricity supply for growing electricity demand. It is focused 
solely on the electricity sector, with no attention to end use appropriateness. It partially addresses 
demand through demand side mitigation strategies but this is limited to a fairly small amount, 
around 5% of future expected demand; it was not initially incorporated in all scenarios, and while 
additional potential for mitigation was acknowledged, it is dismissed as a risk to supply security. 164 
The plan's critics further argue that IRP 2010·2030 initially overestimates the costs of renewable 
energy sourceS. 165 While it reduces' them in later versions, the plan does not adequately account for 
the future reduction in costs through 'technology learning' (expected to be steep, particularly in the 
162 Ibid, pp 24-25 
163 Ibid, pp 26 
164 Ibid, pp 36 
165 Idasa (2010) Submission on the draft integrated resource plan assumptions. Pp 2. Available at 
http://toolkits.reeep.orglfile yploadl8917 tmpphpdB3lJO.pdf [accessed 13/09/2011] 
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cases of solar power),166 and that its methodologies do not truly reflect sophisticated integrated 
resource planning approaches, but rather an advanced exercise in demand forecasting to build 
sufficient supply.167 The plan therefore reveals a strong resistance to a genuine shift to end use 
energy and electricity planning, preferring electricity as a means of energy provision, with little 
consideration of the purpose that energy is put to. This further suggests a strong policy regime with 
an interest in granting preference to electricity, and ensuring an abundant supply of it 
The development and timing of the policy also reinforces its Supply paradigm categorisation. The 
IRP 2010 is exclusively an electricity planning policy, with plans extending into the long term. 
However, it was developed and finalised before four policies that should inform its choices. These 
policies are the Integrated Energy Plan (IEP), the White Paper on Climate Change, the Independent 
System and Market Operator Establishment Act and the Renewable Energy White Paper Mid Term 
Review. For energy and electricity policy planning to be categorised as paradigm three or paradigm 
four, electricity planning (the IRP 2010) needs to be informed by the Integrated Energy P.lan, which 
determines the country's energy choices based on end use planning, and renewable energy targets 
(White Paper review) and the country's climate change mitigation strategies, especially given that 
the electricity industry is South Africa's primary carbon emitter. The structure of the electricity 
industry itself should also inform the state's electricity planning processes. This structure is likely to 
change significantly with the introduction of the Independent System and Market Operator, the lack 
of which has been significant barrier to the entry of independent power producers to the market 
The release date for the IEP is, at the time of writing of this study, unknown. The White Paper on 
Climate Change is due in late 2011 and the Renewable Energy Mid Term Review is long overdue its 
2009/2010 financial year initial release date. The Independent System and Market Operator 
Establishment Bill is before parliament at the time of writing. 
166 Trollip, H et al (2010) 
167 Idasa (2010) 
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South Africa '5 electricity policy regime 
It is clear from the above the dominant regime in electricity policy in South Africa is firmly located 
in the Supply paradigm. This also suggests the regime has not changed significantly since the 
introduction of the Energy White Paper in 1998, or perhaps even since the oil crisis of the 1970s, 
with the exception of some changes in institutional arrangements and players in the regime. If 
changes have occurred, they appear to have deepened the coalition between government, Eskom 
and energy intensive industry, with the three cooperating in the drafting of policy with little other 
outside influence. It is clear that the regime has coalesced around the issue of cheap electricity, 
which is underpinned by the belief in neoliberal economic solutions as the best source of growth 
and development. The power arrangements are stacked in this regime's favour. Eskom holds 
knowledge and skills and controls the country's power infrastructure (significantly as the primary 
supplier of information to the regulator). The mining and mining related manufacturing industries 
hold significant economic power, which is unrivalled in this policy area in the country. Political 
power is held by the government and ANC, which understands growth in the industrial sector to be 
its best source of economic growth job and job creation, and derives significant support from 
workers and unions in energy intensive industrial and mining industries. Industry enjoys 
international competitive advantage through the cheap cost and preferential industrial pricing of 
South Africa's electricity and relative abundance of supply. 
Institutional arrangements in energy and electricity policy have changed somewhat over the period, 
I 
particularly with respect to oversight. Oversight by government ministries and departments has 
shifted, from commercially specified oversight to specifically energy specified oversight. This 
results in more attention and skills being devoted to energy policy but also a loss of coordination in 
policy making and confusion around reform in the electricity industry, particularly with respect to 
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private and renewable power production. I68 The establishment of the NER and then NERSA 
provided electricity oversight institutions with some of the capacity required to formulate policy 
independently of Eskom, although Eskom's influence in government's policy-making process still 
appears significant. Eskom remains the primary information supplier to the regulator,I69 as the 
activities of the state funded South African National Energy Research Institute and the South 
African National Energy Development Institute remain limited as these institutions are in their 
infancy with limited capacity and funding. I7o This leads to typical information asymmetries 
experienced by regulators, whereby vertically integrated monopolies retain more accurate . 
information on demand and costs, and have better access to the information, making it difficult for 
the regulator to work against the monopoly's incentive to act anti-competitively.I7I To overcome 
this challenge requires extensive resources for the regulator; NERSA retains only four full time and 
five part time staff in terms of the National Energy Regulator Act. 172 Additional regulator 
responsibilities include licensing both producers and distributors, over which it has little power to 
act independently without interference from municipalities and Eskom in terms of the 
constitution. 173 
This chapter has also demonstrated that the policies themselves have changed little over this period. 
They continue to place availability of supply of electricity ahead of other considerations, in the 
interest of economic development. This includes seeing sustainable energy sources primarily as an 
opportunity for economic growth rather than as part of a comprehensive strategy to achieve long-
168 Idasa (2009) Coriflicting Policies for renewable energy in South Africa. Available at 
http://www.idasa.org/our productslresourcesloutputlconflicting policies for renewable/?pid=electricitv governanc 
~ I accessed 20/0912011] 
16 NERSA (2007) Consultation Paper: Eslcom Application for Multi-~ar Price Determination Rule Changes. 
Available at http://www.nersa.org.zaiAdminlDocumentlEditorlfilelConsultationo/02Qpaoer.pdf [accessed 01/1012011] 
r~20. 
o lYler, E (2009) pp 12-13. 
171 Gillward, A (2009) Good Intentions. Poor Outcomes: Telecommunications Reform in South Africa in 
Telecommunications Policy (29) pp 469-91. Pp 4S3. 
172 Newberry, D et at (200S) South African Network Infrastructure Review: Electricity. Paper written for the 
National Treasury and thh Department of Public Enterprises, Government of South Africa. Available at: 
http://www.gsb.uct.ac.zaifilesiSAElectricitvPaperOS.pdf[accessed 09/0S/2011] pp 74-75. 
173 Ibid, pp 74-75 , 
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term energy sustainability. This is also demonstrated by the reluctance to enforce demand side 
mitigation measures for fear of the economic and investment consequences. Electricity is seen as an 
essential industry, not as not as one of several potential energy sources for services. 
The manifestation of this regime appears to be built around five major players: the Department of 
Energy (DOE), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of Public Enterprises (DPE), 
Eskom, and the large mining and industrial consumers. The Department of Energy promulgates 
electricity policy; the DTI has industrial policies which view cheap energy as a source of 
international economic competitiveness and renewable energy only as a possibility for growth; the 
DPE persists in its ownership of Eskom; and large mining and industrial consumers established the 
Energy Intensive User Group (BIUG), a lobby group that lobbies for cheap energy for industrial 
players in the name of sustainable economic growth. 174 The User Group's membership accounts for 
44% of the country's electricity consumption and includes miners such as Bhp Billiton, Anglo 
Platinum, industrial manufacturers such as ArcelorMittal SA, cement producer PPC Cement, 
formerly government owned energy company Sasol and majority government owned transport 
company Transnet, deepening the government's interest in lowest possible cost electricity and 
energy users access to government. 175 Since 2008 an additional lobby group, the Manufacturing 
Circle, who share several members with the EIUG, including ArcelorMittal SA and PPC Cement, 176 
has established a working group the Departments of Trade and Industry and Economic 
Development to expedite the IPAP and address rising input costs. 177 It has also petitioned NERSA to 
174 EUIG, The Energy Intensive Users Group of Southern Africa. available at http://www.eiug.org.zalabout/ 
{accessed 20/0912011) 
75 EUIG, EUIG Membership. available at http://www.eiug.org.zalmembership/ [accessed 2010912011] 
176 Manufacturing Circle (2011) Member companies and representatives. Available at 
http://www.manufacturingcircle.co.zalmember companies.html [accessed 01110/2011] 
177 Department of Trade and Industry (2011) Government and manufacturing circleform a working group to 
speed up key issues in the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP)and New Growth Path. Available at 
http://www.info.gov.zalspeechIDynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=20940&tid=40257 [accessed 01110/2011] 
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prevent further Eskom electricity price increases above 9%.178 This has further strengthened the 
prevailing Supply paradigm policy regime. 
178 Creamer, T (2011) Manufacturingjobs vulnerable to yet more power price increases. Available at 
http://www.engineeringnews.co.zalarticle/manufacturing-jobs-vulnerable-to-yet-more-oower-price-increases-20 11-
09-27 [accessed 02110/2011] 
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Chapter 4 
Barriers to Regime Change 
As discussed in chapter 2, in order for paradigmatic changes in policy to occur, regime change or a 
paradigm change in the existing regime is necessary. As demonstrated in chapter 3, South Africa has 
had a stable regime determining electricity policy since democratisation, organised around the need 
to ensure secure electricity of supply at the lowest possible cost in the interests of economic 
development and industrialisation. This regime limits the country's ability to respond to the 
challenges presented by climate change. Resource shortages and long term economic stability point 
toward the likelihood that the country's ability to maintain comparative advantage through cheap 
electricity will decline given the immediate investment requirements of the industry and increasing 
limitations on the availability of coal. 179 
There are significant barriers to ousting this policy regime and replacing it with one that pays more 
significant attention to these issues. These barriers are· best understood through policy regime 
change theory (as discussed in chapter 2), which argues that in order for policy regimes to change 
several conditions are necessary. The regime needs to be exposed to stressors and enablers (which 
test the regime and its ability to control the policy area), paradigm shifts (through a change in the 
intellectual credibility of the regime), power shifts (a change in the ability of regime members or 
members of competing regimes to influence policy choices and their regulatory arrangements), a 
legitimacy crisis (through which public belief in the regime and its paradigm is eroded) and finally, 
organisational and policy change (through change in the policy positions and the organisation and 
institutional boundaries of the sector). This chapter will examine the extent to which the South 
Africa electricity policy area has experienced these conditions, how the current regime has resisted 
them and demonstrate that ousting the regime is a significant barrier to South Africa's energy 
179 Hartnady, C (2010) South Africa's Diminishing Coal Reserves in South African Journal of Science 106(9/10) 
pp4 
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sustainability. 
Stressors and enablers 
The South African electricity sector has experienced a number of stressors and enablers since 
democratisation in 1994. Immediately following the transition it was put under significant political 
pressure to ensure that access to household electricity was universalised. Within a few years the 
sector was under significant political pressure to restructure, in tenns of both its transmission and its 
distribution systems. Just over a decade after the first elections, the sector faced its most significant 
stressor: a supply crisis since 2006, whereby there are periods when demand exceeds supply (during 
maintenance operations) and load shedding is necessary. This shortage of supply has necessitated 
the construction of additional capacity that was not adequately planned for, resulting in significant 
financial implications for both Eskom and the state. This fmancial burden is the fourth significant 
stressor on the sector. Additionally, international pressure aimed at climate change mitigation has 
created a fifth stressor, due to South Africa's high emissions levels. 
In response to the first stressor, the regime has been mostly successful in providing universal access 
to electricity. The National Electrification Programme has succeeded in giving a large majority of 
citizens access to electricity in some fonn, including a free monthly allocation. ISO Electricity 
remains comparatively expensive for these household to use and is not necessarily the primary 
household energy choice despite access. The regime, however, has effectively overcome this 
stressor. 
The regime has also been successful in resisting political pressure to restructure the electricity 
distribution and transmission sectors. Government has abandoned plans to introduce regional 
180 Tinto EM and Banda KG (2005) The Integrated National Electrification Programme and political democracy 
in the South African Journal o/Energy 16 (4) pp 29-30 
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electricity distributors that would have removed the responsibility from municipalities. This is 
mainly due to the financial implications on the treasury of removing a significant revenue stream 
from the municipalities and the municipalities being unwilling to cede constitutional rights to 
manage electricity distribution.181 A government belief in fiscal prudence as important for economic 
stability and as a signal to investors underpins this resistance. 
The supply crisis, which was highlighted by power outages in the Western Cape in 2006, attracted 
close public scrutiny of the future supply situation. This crisis is regarded as the most significant 
stressor on the regime -- it has done the most to threaten its legitimacy. As a result of this crisis, 
South Africa recognized the need for significant investment in new electricity supply to meet 
growing demand and replace ageing infrastructure. 182 This had not been planned for in electricity 
pricing. 183 Instead of increasing pricing to finance necessary infrastructure upgrades, the regime 
created its own fourth stressor: the decision to use debt to finance new capacity. This debt is 
government guaranteed and is beginning to have an effect on the country's credit rating. 184 
International climate mitigation pressure is another stressor on the regime. However, since there are 
currently no binding international agreements on climate change, this stressor has had little to no 
effect on the regime. The result is that the government has made announcements on the reduction of 
emissions and published the 2011 National Climate Change Response White Paper, neither of 
which is aligned with its other domestic policies. This is true of both its industrial policies and 
energy policies. Government has also admitted that it will not commit to its emissions to without an 
international climate deal with that includes fmancial assistance.18S The regime continues to make 
policies without reference to the government's international statements of intent. 
181 Newberry, D and Eberhard, A (2008) pp 64 
182 Ibid, pp 4-5 
IS3 Eberhard, A (2007) pp 232 
184 I-net Bridge, (2011) Moody's warns o/significant Es/com hikes available at 
http://www.fin24.com!EconomylMoodvs-warns-of-significant-Eskom-hikes-20 111111 accessed 24/1112011 
18S Peters, D (2011) Media statement by the Minister of Energy at the COP17 Media Briefing of 1 December 2011 
available at http;llallafrica.com/stories/201112020433.html [accessed 20/01/2012] 
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Paradigm shift 
There has been no significant shift away from Marquard's Supply paradigm in South Africa's energy 
and electricity policy since democratisation, as was demonstrated in chapter 3. However, an 
analysis of the public participation in parliamentary hearings for new electricity legislation since the 
1998 Energy White Paper shows a definite rise in competition between paradigms. Public hearings 
in the Parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises on the Eskom Conversion Act (the most 
significant piece of legislation to come out of the 1998 White Paper), saw two submissions: one 
from the Department of Public Enterprises and one from trade union federation Cosatu. Both 
submissions represented thinking in line with Marquard's supply paradigm, focussing on ensuring 
centralised supply of secure electricity. 186 
The Portfolio Committee on Mining arid Energy, while considering the 2008 National Energy Bill, 
received 18 submissions in public hearings, representing' a marked increase in public interest in 
energy policy; Of the 18 submissions, 17 could be specified in terms of Marquard's paradigms. Six 
of the 17 fall into Marquard's Supply paradigm, these submissions are from Nersa, Eskom, the 
Energy Intensive Users' Group, state owned liquid fuels company PetroSA and the Southern African 
Faith Communities Environment Institute (SAFCEI). The latter is the only surprising submission in 
this category. While the SAFCEI submission advocated the use of renewable sources of electricity, 
it did so only to address an increase in supply to meet growing demand and maintained the 
necessity of lowest possible cost. The remaining eleven all fell into Marquard's SupplylDemand 
paradigm. Five of these were in the SupplylDemand paradigm in the weak sense, only advocating 
increased regulation with respect to demand side mitigation and energy efficiency. Of these 
submissions, two came from civil society, one from an academic research unit, one from a private 
186 Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2001) Eskom Conversion Bill Public Hearings available at 
hnp:llwww.pmg.org.za/minutesl200 1 0508-eskom-conversion-bill-public-hearings accessed 31110/2011 
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cit izen and one from a government agency. the South African National Energy Research Institute 
(established in 2004 and responsible for pllblic interest energy research).l!7 The remaining six 
submissions were strong examples of the SupplylDemand paradigm. demonstrati ng some 
consideration of end lISe of enelEY or energy service requirements in supply choices. These all came 
from civil socidy organisations, including non-governmental organisations (NOOS).I!' 
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The latter six submissions mentioned above signal the emergence of a rival energy paradigm 
seeking to participate in South African energy and electricity polic>' making. It seeks the usc of 
renewable energy for electricity supply and other energy services as well as increased efficiency in 
South Africa 's energy usage, This rival paradigm exists predominantly among civil society, and 
particularly am<:mg environmentally directed civil society organisations. which represents a small 
portion of Soutll Africn's population. There is limited cohesion in their submissions. suggesting a 
lack of organisation amongst subscrilmrs to tile paradigm. This lack of cohesion combined with 
limited popular support 511ggests little power to influence policy making at this stage. Limited 
'" SAl-iERI. Sollth African NOIioool Ene'¥Y R .... reh Institute (Pty) Ltd. Avait~b1o.t 
hnp:l/www.,""cri oo::.z .. 'indeJ\,html [""0 ... 0<1 20/10/2011] 
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participation by ~upply paradigm adherents -- limited to a union federat ion, state enterprises and an 
inlcn:;ivc us¢ rs' lobby group -- also suggests li olited concern within the hegemonic supply regime 
aboilt new competitors. 
Public participation in the IRP2010 increased significantly from previous policy processes, Some 
200 participants from civil society, business, academic and private citizen~ were consulted in the 
drafting processes. ' "') The policy was drafted by th~ Department of Energy's Technical Task Team, 
the composition of which is outlined in the previous chapter. [ 0(1 Thirty-two submissions were made 
to a public preliminary plenary hearing to Parliament's Energy Committee. At the plenary hearings 
15 submissions were made by business, 13 by civil ~ociety organisation and lobby groups, and four 
by academic~, private indh'iduals and consultants. Of the business group, eight made submissions 
in the Supply paradigm, with the remaining ~dven submission ~ falling in the SupplyfDemand 
paradigm; five were weak and two wer~ strong. Ofth~ eight compani~s petitioning in the Supply 
paradigm, three were renewable energy advocates, seeking a Supply paradigm with renewable 
electricity, two were private nuclear providers; there was one submission each from a mining firm, a 
liquid natural gas lirm, and a paper firm. AI! seven of the firms in the Supply/Demand paradigm 
were either renewable energy and electricit), proyiders or marketers of energy efficiency products. 
Amongst civil society. NOOs and lobby groups making submissions, five were in the Supply 
paradigm: these were busines~ lobby groups, Business Unity South Ali-ica (BUSA), the Euro. 
nllCiear associatioLl Niasa, the Southern Africa Solar Thermal and electricity Association and 
SAI'CEl. Thc remaining eight submissio n~ were a divided fou r and four into strong and weak 
version of the Supply/Demand paradigm: a wind ene'g)' lobby group, four environmentally 
focussed NGOs, a governance NOO and two civil society organisations. Of consultants and 
'" Deportment of Energy (20 II) IRP2 publio ""..-ing o\/leoIne!. Av~j l.ble 01 
~llp:llwww.l>!l!g .o!¥ .• !¥reportl201101 26.drPMm<".-IlWmes·j.pl -pu bt k -ne.rl ngs-OCjefLng acce .. Nl t310SJ2 0 t t . 
'''' td ... (20lO) Submi»ion to Public Hearing ~vai tobl~ at 
hnp;llwww.encrgY.goy.llIiI RPlim~.20filWlDASA rn.p<!f acce" ed 3 ti l 0/20 11 
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academics, three made cases for in the Supply/Demand paradigm, one of which was strong, while 
an energy conslillant made a case in the sllpply paradigm. 191 
Figure 2 . Responses to Ji?P 2010, Preliminary Plenary HearinG 
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Subsequent to the redrafting of the IRP 2010, 81 public submissions were made in pub lic hearing to 
the parliamentary committee on energy. Of the 81 submissions 35 were made by businesses and 
government affiliates, 37 by civil society, NGOs and lobby groups, nine by academics and 
consultants. Of the 35 business and government submissions, 21 were in the Supply paradigm and 
eight in the SupplylDemand paradigm (six were not specifiable either throug h in ru: cessibiliry or 
becaust' the submissions did not address specifiable issues). In the Supply/Demand paradigm Ilve 
were weak and three were strong. However, of the business submissions 14 came from companies 
offering renewable ertergy services or marketing energ}' efficiency products and of these nine made 
submissions in the Supply paradigm. Of civil society, NGOs and lobby groups 16 made sllbmissions 
in the Supply paradigm, whi le 15 made submissions in the SlipplylDemand paradigm and (six were 
not specifiable). Of th" sc in the SupplylDematxl paradigm six were in the weak paradigm and nine 
were strong. The 16 in the Supply paradigm included anti-privatisation groups, nuclear industry 
lobby groups, paper industry lobby groups, energ}' users lobby groups, mining lobby groups, and 
'" S •• appendix 2 
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some renewable energy advocaw~ . Of the nine academics and consultants who made submissions. 
four submi~sions fall into the Supply paradigm, and one in the Supply/Demand paradigm (weak). 
(four were non-specil1able ). 192 
'" So. o.ppmdix 3 
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These res\llts demonstrute If",t tfler~ is an altemati~e Supply/Demand paradigm with growing 
support: it still lacks majority support S\lfficient to unhalance t~ dominant SlLppl;-' paradigm, It, 
emergence has occurred at the SlIme t ime as an increase in pllhlic SlLppolt for its ri~al Suppl;-' 
paradigm -- previously unchallenged in early post apartheid energy und electricity policy-making, 
Additionally. several firms. lobby groups and consultants mad~ cases in the Supply paradigm hut 
with an emphasis on nuclear as a basis for supply, or n~w g~neratioo capacity inst~ad of coal. This 
suggests t~ ~merg~nce of a s~cond rival paradigm to th~ cheap coal based electrici ty supply 
paradigm ,uppurted by the hegemonic r~gime . 
While 'lippurt increased for a Supply/Demand paradigm, this has been mainly amongst civil sodety 
organisations and NGOs. There is linle evidence of support for such a paradigm in government or 
big business. Even firms that ar~ seeking to be renewahle energy providers s~~m to ha,'e a 
preference for a S\lppl}' paradigm. rile reason for this i, unclear. but perilap' they prefer an 
electricity-dominated sector to ensure a big market, a, opJX"ed to a effici ent and end u"" ba:led 
,y,tem. Academic, appear 'plit On which paradigm i, preferable, ,ugge,!ing that the SlLpply 
paradigm has no! been sllIlicienlly undennined by in!elleCluals for there !o be a ,ignificant 
paradigm shifts, The split is not based along fitlds of study, as might be expected. with ecorwmisl, 
011 one side showing preference for a sliPply pmadigm that can maintain cheap energy and energy 
'p"ciali,t, on t~ ot~r ,ide argui ng liJr a Supply/Demand parddigm. It is not so simple. energy 
'peciali,t, an:: divided, with ~ !JCT Energy Resource Centre advocating a Supply.'Uemand 
paradigm while the Energy In,ti!ule a! the Cape Pen; n,ula Uni,'ersity of T echnoiogy advocati ng the 
Supply paradigm. Within government, advocates for the Supply/Demand paradigm are limited to 
local go;' emment and re,earch agencies with little policy-making power. 
Slipport for the rival emerging nuclear"ba,ed Supply pmadigm i, centred among large electricity 
users, Eskom, polen!ialnlLclear ,uppli~r.l. ,uch as \.Ve,tinghou,e, and consultants with Eskom links. 
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such as Mike Deats, a former executive director at Eskom, who called for in excess of 15 000 MW 
of nuclear capacity to be built through the IRP 2010. 193 Outside of the parliamentary hearings, 
former Eskom chairman Bobby Godsell has said that it is necessary to build nuclear capacity of 20 
OOO.MW through the IRP 2010. 194 Despite the growing strength of this rival paradigm, its influence 
remains limited, with little commitment from the government to nuclear builds. 
The intellectual credibility of the Supply paradigm, therefore remains significant, while its 
opposition remains fragmented, undermining the strength of a SupplylDemand paradigm. The 
emerging paradigm is also threatened by a rival nuclear Supply paradigm, which additionally has 
significant potential to absorb support of the coal driven Supply paradigm. As business has a 
preference for significant base load supply to ensure security of supply, this group may shift more 
toward the nuclear Supply paradigm. Eskom~ which has the most to gain from supply choices that 
will require large state investment and high levels of security, could shift allegiance toward a 
nuclear Supply paradigm and away from coal. 
Legitimacy crisis 
Despite being subject to five significant stressors, the cheap electricity Supply paradigm has not 
faced a significant legitimacy crisis. Wilson argues that a regime experiences a legitimacy crisis 
when there is a widespread popular loss of confidence in the regime's ability to solve policy 
problems. This is usually the result of exploitation of stressors by political leaders intent on policy 
change. 19S This challenges the rationality of the existing regime through expanding the issue and 
capturing media attention, shifting debate away from the policy arena, to alternative forums. This is 
193 
Deats, M (2010) Presentation on the IRP2010. Available at 
http://www.enerev.gov.zaIIRP/irp%20filesIMIKE DEATS.pdf accessed 26/0112012 
194 GodseU, R(2010) in Helen Suzman Foundation Quarterly Roundtable series, September 2010, Volume 17. 
195 Wilson, C (2000) pp 264. 
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typically led by political leaders outside the government. 
The stressors experienced by the dominant cheap electricity for economic development regime have 
typically been threats to the electricity sector's ability to supply electricity to industry. At least this is 
the case within South Africa. There is significant international pressure on the state to make policy 
changes to limit emissions, however, to a large extent South Africa has been able to hide from this 
pressure through its status as a developing country. Pressure within the country has been focussed 
on ensuring security of supply, and particularly security of supply to industry. Some other stress on 
the regime has been caused by protest against the cost of electricity to poor households. Little stress 
has come from within the state to reduce carbon emissions, mitigate against climate change and 
increase sustainability. 
Opposition politicians lack significant capacity to harness popular support to challenge regimes 
politically. The ANC has held, and continues hold, popular dominance, achieving between 69 and 
65 percent of votes in all national elections since 1994.196 There is also only a small measure of 
capacity within the ANC to challenge a cheap electricity regime internally. The ANC's internal 
politics is dominated by parties with interests in cheap power, from mining shareholders to mining 
and metal working labour unions seeking to ensure job security. The ANC is under significant 
pressure to ensure job creation, which means making any decisions that run against traditional 
economic strengths is politically difficult. The government's New Growth Path and industrial 
policies demonstrate that there is little political will within the ANC to change the country's energy 
system and its electricity regime. 
There is little evidence of widespread popular criticism of the sustainability of South Africa's 
electricity sector; demonstrated by submissions to public hearings. Participants seeking to change 
196 Jeffrey, A (20 1 O)Chasing the Rainbow South African Institute of Race Relations, Cape Town. Pp 26-27 
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the country's electricity paradigm were limited primarily to small civil society groups with limited 
membership. The largest popular movement to make submission on any of the energy policies was 
labour union federation Cosatu, whose submissions have been uniformly in the Supply paradigm. 
South Africa's other significant popular movement is churches which are represented in public 
hearings by the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and the Southern African Faith 
Communities' Environment Institute (SAFCEI). Both SACC and SAFCEl's submissions on the 
Energy Bill and the IRP 2010 advocated a move to renewable electricity production but maintained 
the need for a centralised affordable electricity supply. Thus these two groups are also categorised 
in the Supply paradigm, not significantly undermining the existing regime.197,198,199 
Eskom faces the most pressure as a result of the country's electricity supply crisis. However, as 
demonstrated in chapter 3, it is not the only member of the dominant regime. The type of political 
support described by Wilson as necessary to undermine the legitimacy of the regime has not been 
garnered by the competing regimes but by other members of the dominant regime. Politicians in the 
leading party and govemment-- particularly the Department of Economic Development and DTI --
won public attention with policy strategies such as the National Industrial Policy Frameworks, and 
the follow up Industrial Policy Action Plans and the New Growth Path. These strategies target job 
creation as the main goal, but support an increase in electricity supply to secure existing heavy 
industry, hoping to create new and guarantee existing jobs. The strategies pay lip service to the 
development of a "green economy" where renewable electricity can be supplied into the existing 
grid and the potential for the production of household efficiency products such as solar water 
heaters. As demonstrated in chapter 3 the plans aim for development that deepens the economy's 
electricity intensity. 
191 South African Council of Churches (2010) Clean Energy for a Healthy Nation Available at 
http://www.energy.gov.zalIRP/im%20files/SACC.pdf 
198 SAFCEI (2008) Public Submission on the National Energy Bill available at 
http://www.pmg.org.zalreportl20080731-public-hearings-national-energy-bill-b52-2008 
199 SAFCEI (2010) Comments on the IRP2010 available at 
http://www.energy.gov.zalIRP/im%20files/SAFCEI JHB.pdf 
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Therefore, while it is clear that the dominant cheap electricity regime has been put under pressure 
by a number of stressors, this has not led to a significant crisis of legitimacy in popular terms. 
Widespread popular support for a change in the electricity regime and the energy paradigm remain a 
challenge that competing regimes, supporting an alternative paradigm, have not met. The extent of 
this challenge is exceptionally large, given the dominance of the ANC over popular politics in the 
country, and its belief that protection of energy intensive industry is necessary for its job creation 
imperative. 
Power shifts 
According to policy regime theory, power shifts can manifest in a number of ways, but can be 
understood primarily as being either internal shifts or external shifts in power. Internal shifts refer to 
changes within the regime, such as collapses of coalitions, changes in presidency or parliament, and 
defections of important factions. External power shifts refer to improvements in the positions of 
competing regimes such as an ability to attract mass support, .changes in the abilities of opposition 
leadership such as its ability to attract funding, support build coalitions, expand issues and access 
the media and exploit stressors and enablers. A shift in power in an external sense would 
demonstrate the competing regime's ability to undermine the legitimacy of the dominant regime 
through widespread public persuasion. 200 
In terms of internal power shifts, the South African experience has been limited since 1994. The 
change in political power in 1994 was marked by the inclusion of the ANC into the existing regime,. 
on the agreement that Eskom would expand public access to electricity. Further politically-driven 
attempts to make changes in the regime have seen limited success. The reorganisation of the 
200 j Wilson, C (2000), pp 264 
72 
University of  Cape Town
distribution industry from municipalities to regional electricity distributors was abandoned, under 
pressure from the treasury and the municipalities.201 Attempts to create an independent systems and 
market operator responsible for the transmission and acquisition of electricity has been legislated 
but not finalised at the time of writing, despite the fact that the policy process to make this change 
began in 1997.2°2 This move has been largely resisted by Eskom, whose monopolistic control of the 
electricity industry is threatened by the separation of the generation and transmission industries. 
Changes in presidency over the period have not resulted in dramatic changes in policy and have 
been limited to changes in the head of the party. Economic policies from the RDP, through GEAR, 
Asgi-SA and the latest New Growth Path have sought to deepen the country's industrialisation in 
pursuit of economic development and thereby deepen its electricity intensity and dependency on its 
comparative advantage in cheap electricity. There is relative stability within the ruling party and its 
allies, Cosatu and the South African Communist Party. Disputes emerged primarily over the means 
of deepening the country's industrialisation. Eskom remains state owned despite being corporatised, 
and the government still views electricity intensive industry as its best source of potential growth, as 
in demonstrated in its industrial policy. Furthermore the make-up of the Department of Energy's 
Technical Task Team, outlined in the previous chapter, shows that policy decision making power in 
the electricity industry is still firmly located within government, Eskom and big business. 
Government, Eskom and members of the EUIG dominate the task team with only limited 
representation by consultants and academics.203 
Clearly, the electricity policy power arrangements remain a significant challenge to competing 
policy regimes in the South African energy and electricity sector. While there have been some 
internal power shifts -- particularly just after democratisation -- this has not translated to a reduction 
201 Newberry, D and Eberhard, A (2008) pp 64 
202 Eberhard, A (2007) 
203 Idasa (2010) Submission to Public Hearing available at 
http://www.energy.gov.zalIRP/ilp%20files/IDASA CPT.pdf accessed 3111012011 
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in power in the dominant regime or an increased ability to create power in competing regimes. The 
alliance between government, the ANC and business is based on a mutual interest in growth and 
economic development. The alliance between the ANC and Cosatu remains strong based on a 
mutual interest in job preservation. The links between Eksom and government remain strong, with 
Eskom dominating the policy making process in alliance with big business, and making policy 
decisions in favour of a Supply paradigm based system. There have been only limited internal 
power shifts. There is no demonstration of competing regimes' ability to gather power either. 
There is little demonstrable mass support for alternative electricity paradigms, with both major mass 
participation organisations -- unions and the churches -- preferring Supply paradigm policies in 
their responses to electricity policy documents. The legitimacy of the existing regime remains intact 
despite its exposure to significant stressors. 
Organisational and policy change 
The final element of policy regime change is organisational and policy change. Change in 
organisations that implement policy and implementation of policy changes demonstrate a change of 
policy regime. This occurs through either the establishment of a new or former regime or the 
internal reorganisation of the dominant regime.204 
There has been some change in organisations that implement South Africa's electricity policy. The 
NER was established, and then became NERSA. While providing a legitimate body for the 
regulation of the sector, it remains under-resourced, particularly in terms of personnel and 
information. SANERI was established to deepen research into the sector, but its output remains 
limited and its mandate has been confused by the establishment of SANEDI. Government chose not 
204 Wilson, C (2000) pp 265 
74 
University of  Cape Town
to establish the proposed National Energy Modelling and Information Agency, preferring to allow 
Eskom to continue to be the primary electricity information source for NERSA. This decision 
entrenches the location of energy planning in the DOE and separates it from any additional research 
and data collection body.205 
The other significant organisation changes have been the corporatisation of Eskom and the decision 
to establish an ISMO. The corporatisation of Eskom has done little to change the operations of the 
institution. It remains wholly publicly owned and almost exclusively responsible to the generation 
and transmission of electriCity. The decision to establish an ISMO marks the most significant 
organisational change since democratisation, and the most significant threat to the power ofEskom. 
It is the necessary precursor to the introduction of private electricity generators into the electricity 
market. In this sense, it provides the most likely way to introduce renewable energy into South 
Africa's electricity market, giving independent power producers an unbiased client to sell to. 
However, the establishment of an ISMO does not undermine the regime as it remains in the Supply 
paradigm, with Eskom likely to remain the dominant power supplier because of its established 
infrastructure and access to government guaranteed finance. Without a predictable Renewable 
Energy Feed-in Tariff, an ISMO will continue to favour cheap electricity producers over renewable 
electricity producers, and renewable electricity producers will be reluctant to enter the market. 206 
The ISMO does not present a challenge to the preference for electricity over energy decisions based 
on end use. 
In terms of policy change, it is demonstrated in Chapter 3 that there has been little change on the 
paradigmatic level since democratisation. There has been a gradual acknowledgement of the need to 
introduce renewable energy into the electricity mix, but there has also been a re-entrenchment of the 
need for energy security, based on fossil and nuclear fuels, and that changes should not threaten 
20S 
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potential for economic development and industrialisation. A comparison of the policies to the 
DOE's strategic plans and its annual budgets show that expenditure on change has been limited, 
suggesting limited implementation. 
The Department of Minerals and Energy's first strategic plan for 2000/01 to 2003/04 focused (on 
the energy side) on the implementation of the 1998 Energy White Paper. It sought to gradually 
introduce solar and wind power into the electricity system, alongside the implementation of the 
National Electrification Programme and the restructuring of the distribution industry.207 However, 
the annual report of the Department of Minerals and Energy for the 200312004 financial year shows 
no expenditure on renewable electricity development, acknowledging this is the source of its 
appropriation underspend?08 The Eskom annual report for the same period shows renewable energy 
expenditure as limited to demonstration plants and accounted for along with demonstration plants of 
other forms of electricity production.209 
The 200617 to 201 o/n strategic plan acknowledges the need for new generation capacity and 
establishes the time frames for the Integrated Research Plan but states no preference for renewable 
electricity but it calls on the regulator to license renewable energy providers. The strategic plan 
contains a suggested mid-term review of the 2003 Renewable Energy White Paper and makes 
financial provision for the use of consultants in doing so, but does not plan any expenditure on 
renewable energy.210 
The 2007/08 to 200911 0 strategic plan establishes objectives for efficiency measures and the 
introduction of alternatives fuels, but set out very limited actions in response to these, such as 
207 Department of Minerals and Energy(2000) Strategic plan for the DME 2000/01-2003/04 pp14-16 
208 Department of Minerals and Energy (2004) Annual Report 2003/2004 pp 83 -95 
209 Eskom (2004 ) Annual Report 2003/04 pp 122 
210 Department of Minerals and Energy (2006) Strategic Plan 200612007 pp 51-63 
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creating awareness and widening access to LPG as a household fuel.2J1 The department's annual 
report for the 2009 financial year also makes no financial provision for renewable energy. It makes 
provision for Eskom's National Electricity Response Team, which coordinates the short-term 
response to the supply crisis, as well Eskom's Energy Efficiency Demand Side Management project, 
which is primarily based on publicity drives targeting voluntary conservation, as widespread switch 
to efficient lighting, with limited industrial savings.212 
The 2008/09 to 2010/11 plan highlights the need for energy diversification but prioritises the 
economy in energy policy making. It allocates subsidies to renewable energy projects to be spent 
across the period and seeks to ensure electricity security, but also promote demand management. 
However, action in these areas is limited to raising awareness.213 By the 2010/11 financial year the 
department increased its annual spending on clean energy subsidies and transfers to R 350 million, 
but spent R 2.9 billion on electrification?14 . 
In late 2011, the government published its National Climate Change Response White Paper. The. 
purpose of the white paper is to manage a national.transition to a low carbon and climate change 
resilient economy, and to make a 'fair' contribution to international emissions reduction.21s The 
strategy of the white paper is to prioritise measures with the greatest combined mitigation and 
adaptation capabilities, particularly those with job creating, poverty alleviating features and the 
lowest cost to business and the economy.216 Its primary focus is policy that will lead to climate 
change resilient development 217 It acknowledges the importance of its integration across national 
policies, particularly in the IPAP and the IRP, but was only published after these were established, 
211 Department of Minerals and Energy (2007) Strategic plan 2007/08-2009/10 pp 76-94 
212 Department of Minerals and Energy(2009) Annual Report 2009 pp 174 
213 Department of Energy (2008) Strategic Plan 2008/09-2010/2011 pp 73-88 
214 Department of Energy (2011) Annual Report 20101201129-31 
21S Department of Environmental Affairs (2011) National Climate Change Response White Paper pp 11 
216 Ibid, pp 14-15 
211 Ibid, pp 13 
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decreasing the likelihood of meaningful integration. While the policy is an important 
acknowl.edgement of the climate change problem, it marks a very limited deviation from the 
country's energy and industrial policies. Development and poverty alleviation are prioritised over 
adaptation and particularly over mitigation. It does not represent a significant policy change or 
threat to the industrial supply energy policy regime. 
Additionally, in November 2011 the government's National Planning Commission released its 
National Development Plan. This document outlines the government's long-term plan for 
development until 2030. Its priority is to reduce poverty, unemployment and inequality in South 
Africa by significant levels. It has targeted a reduction in unemployment from 27% to 6 % by 
2030218 and outlines the economic interventions and outcomes needed to achieve this outcome. 
Through this it addresses the energy needs of the economy. It acknowledges both the need to 
increase supply and increase the use of renew abies in electricity production. It identifies the need to 
build 40000 MW of new generating capacity and proposes that 20000 MW of this should be from 
renewable sources (it is unclear whether this includes nuclear power).219 It also seeks to achieve 
95% electrification to household by 2030.220 However, it also identifies the need for significant 
demand side mitigation measures,221 but these are mostly seen as measures to reduce carbon 
emissions, not as an alternative to increasing energy supply. 
The National Development Plan demonstrates some deviation from previous policy, particularly in 
its approach to expanding South Africa's manufacturing sector. But it still envisions a Supply 
paradigm energy system and preferences electricity of other energy sources, particularly in the 
minerals sector and for households. It makes extensive provision for renewable power and for the 





National Planning Commission (2011) National Development Plan: Vision for 2030 pp 28 
Ibid, pp 153 
Ibid, pp 153 
Ibid, pp 32 
78 
U iv rsity of  Cape Town
system and market operator, but prioritises electricity as an energy choice. 
Clearly there has been an increase in attention for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 
establishing ideal policy outcomes. This has not been met with action or concrete measures to 
achieve these outcomes. The key actions of strategic plans are severely limited in their scope and 
implementation, as demonstrated by their lack of budgetary support from the department and from 
Eskom. While there has been some policy and organisational change, it has not resulted in a change 
in the regime. Changes in policy have been exclusively incremental, such as the planned 
incorporation of renewable electricity into the electricity mix. Changes in policy have also aimed at 
the development of new policies and institutions, such as the creation of NERSA, but do not 
demonstrate a change in the policy paradigm. Further while the policies seek to integrate with each 
other the chronology of their development suggests that this will be difficult to achieve, particularly 
as supply decisions, made through the IRP 2010, have been made prior to the decisions on 
emissions reduction and renewable energy industry support in the Climate Change White Paper and 
National Development Plan. The decision to adopt the ISMO will change power relations to a 
limited extent within the regime, but it remains a cheap industrial electricity supply regime. 
The challenges to overcoming the cheap industrial supply regime are therefore located across the 
pillars of regime change. While there have been significant stressors on the regime these have not 
been effectively used by opponents. The legitimacy of the regime and its paradigm remains largely 
unchallenged in the widespread public discourse, with only small, if vocal, constituency opposing 
it. Despite some first and second order policy change, there has been no third order policy change to 
demonstrate a shift in paradigm of the regime. Organisational changes have lead to a small power 
shift within the regime, away from Eskom, but this has not threatened the paradigm that underpins 
the regime. The challenge to overcoming this regime then remains primarily in the need expand 
support for a competing SupplylDemand paradigm in a way that can undermine the legitimacy of 
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the dominant regime, and force a power shift away from it. 
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ChapterS 
Conclusion 
Using policy regime theory as a means to better understand South African electricity policy 
provides helpful insight into the sector. A strong coalition has formed around the issue of cheap, 
secure, centralised and coal driven electricity and dominates policy. This coalition consists of 1) 
national government, particularly the Departments of Trade and Industry, Public Enterprises, 
Minerals and Energy and the Treasury, 2) state owned electricity company Eskom and 3) energy 
intensive industry, most visibly in the form of the Energy Intensive User Group, whose members 
both individually and collectively seek to influence policy. The motives of each member of the 
coalition's participation in the group are different. Government has demonstrated it believes cheap 
electricity is necessary to underpin growth and development in the South African economy, which it 
believes can best be achieved through industrialisation. This will deepen South Africa's dependence 
on electricity. Eskom is interested in retaining control over South Africa's electricity industry, 
particularly the generation of electricity and all of its current generation infrastructure. Industry in 
South Africa is particularly energy intensive and it is interested in maintaining cheap and secure 
supply to ensure competitiveness. 
While the motives of the participants in the regime differ, their interests in electricity policy 
function in a single policy paradigm -- described by Marquard as the Supply paradigm -- which is 
rooted in the belief that solutions to energy problems are resolved in the long term by an increase in 
energy supply. In South Africa, given the nature of the energy sector -- where electricity is dominant 
-- the paradigm can be applied to electricity specifically. This paradigm describes the belief that 
energy supply should be increased to meet demand as it rises, and that demand mitigation should be 
a temporary measure to reduce demand in times of a supply shortage. The examination of specific 
electricity policy documents in Chapter 3 illustrates that the policy regime is located in the supply 
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paradigm. Some academics, notably Tyler and Marquard, have observed that the policies are 
beginning to shift towards Marquard's Supply/Demand paradigm. However, this study argues that 
while there are some creeping elements of the Supply/Demand paradigm, the policies remain 
fundamentally located in the Supply paradigm. 
With the dominant regime located in the Supply paradigm, the road to reform in the electricity 
industry will be a long one. In order for significant policy change to occur, competitors to the 
dominant regime must capitalise on stressors, which impact the existing system. Only by 
capitalising on the stressors, undermining legitimacy, and changing its power arrangements policies 
and organisations will the dominant paradigm be undermined. Despite significant stress on the 
South African electricity system which threatens the dominant policy regime -- such as equitable 
access to electricity, political pressure for structural reform, a supply crisis and its financial 
implications and international climate pressure - the balance of power has not been significantly 
disrupted to result in regime change. 
Opponents of the cheap electricity Supply Regime have failed to undermine the intellectual position 
of the dominant regime. Among participants in policy processes, advocates of the Supply Regime 
remain more numerous and better coordinated. Supporters of a significant alternative paradigm 
remain uncoordinated and divided between weak and strong versions of the paradigm. A competing 
alternative Supply Regime based on supply security through increased nuclear capacity has created 
competition amongst competing regimes. This regime, however, remains· in its infancy, with little 
government commitment to new nuclear build, without a commitment in the National Development 
Plan and the potential threat of safety concerns following failures at Japan's Fukushima plant. 
Support for the SupplylDemand paradigm is lower than anticipated. 
While many participants in the public policy process sought the introduction of more renewable 
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electricity, many of these remained in the Supply paradigm as they did not advocate end use 
consideration of energy choices or long-term energy efficiency and demand side mitigation. 
Included in this group, are many of the renewable electricity producers, a group that one would 
assume has a preference for a change in the paradigm, and religious civil society, the civil society 
group with the greatest potential to mobilise mass support for change. Opinion amongst academics, 
both energy experts and economists, varies between the maintenance of a coal based cheap 
electricity industry in the Supply paradigm and a sustainable climate mitigating system in the 
SupplylDemand paradigm. The Supply paradigm has, therefore, not been wholly overturned by the 
intelligentsia in the policy area. 
Lack of widespread support for paradigm and regime change means the legitimacy of the regime in 
has not been significantly undermined. While the supply crisis puts Eskom under significant stress, 
the opportunity to capitalise on this has not been harnessed effectively by political or regime 
opposition. The political dominance of the ANC hampers the ability for opposition parties to 
harness widespread popular support for change. The limited opposition from civil society to the 
Supply paradigm, particularly amongst the churches and the unions, has further limited opposition 
capacity to harness support. 
While there have been some power shifts within the dominant regime these have been limited to the 
shifting of capacity within the regime to make electricity policy and control over electricity 
infrastructure, from Eskom towards government. It has led to some policy change, improving 
regulation of the industry and attempts to allow private generators equitable access to the electricity 
transmission grid. Power shifts within the regime have not changed the paradigm of the regime; this 
limits the extent to which policy will change. There have been no significant power changes 
external to the regime, and these remain unlikely given the dominance of the ANC and electricity 
intensive industry over South Africa's politics and economics. It seems likely that the most 
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significant potential threat to the current power arrangements is international pressure for climate 
change mitigation and this would be dependent on the outcomes of international climate 
negotiations. 
In the 1994 to 2011 period there has been some organisational and policy change: corporatisation 
ofEskom, improvement of the regulatory regime, widespread electrification and moves to gradually 
introduce privately generated power and renewable power into the system. The industry regulator 
remains fairly weak, as do other new energy research institutions; the introduction of private 
producers has been limited and heavily resisted by Eskom; spending on renewable electricity, 
efficiency and demand side mitigation remains limited. There is a lack of clarity and consensus over 
the nature of power purchasing agreements with private players, as well as with the renewable 
energy feed in tariff for private renewable power producers. While there has been som,e change, it 
remains solely first and second order policy change, not third order change, and therefore remains 
firmly located in the Supply paradigm. 
Therefore, the dominant coal base cheap secure electricity regime in the Supply paradigm is a 
significant barrier to policy change in the South African electricity system. It remains powerful, 
popularly legitimate and in control of policy decisions, despite significant stress having been placed 
on the regime and its electricity sector. 
Limitations 
The limitations to this thesis are found primarily in its depth and the documents to which it has had 
access. In terms of depth, the limitations come through the need to study a number of factors in a 
relatively small space. In order to establish the nature of the barrier to regime change, the study 
needed to take into account stressors and enablers, paradigm changes, power changes, legitimacy 
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and organisational and policy changes, each of which would normally merit their own chapter. The 
same problem occurs in establishing the nature of the regime, where the power arrangements, 
paradigm and policies each merit their own chapter and individual study. The consequence of this is 
the limited extent to which each of these factors can be examined individually. I have given primary 
attention to paradigms and paradigm shifts, which I consider the most important element 
underpinning the regime and potential policy change. This limitation also places a limit on the 
methods used; further studies could be done with a more direct focus on each factor allowing more 
rigorous methods in each area. 
Another limitation has been the availability of appropriate documents. Attempts to access public 
submissions on the 1998 and 2003 White Papers through the Department of Energy were 
unsuccessful, as were attempts to access public submissions to the Departmental Technical Task 
Team prior to the drafting of the IRP 2010. I have therefore been limited to documents and minutes 
of parliamentary business available on the Department of Energy website (in the case of the IRP 
2010) and through the· Parliamentary Monitoring Group. Unfortunately, the Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group does not have records of submissions on the two White Papers, which 
determined the need to look at the submission on the Eskom Conversion Bill and the National 
Energy Bill. The implication of this is that this paper has dealt primarily with the legislative rather 
than executive policy making process, particularly in its analysis of public hearings. These represent 
the legislative response to executive policy making, with information on direct the direct executive 
consultation process being unavailable. 
Areas for further research 
The application of policy regime theory to the South African case in other areas of policy has the 
potential to provide useful insights. Analysis of South Africa's industrial policy using policy regime 
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theory would be an interesting and worthwhile study, especially given the influence of industrial 
policy on the country's electricity policy. There also need for expansion of the literature on policy 
making outside the developed world. The theory of policy making in the developing world is 
relatively limited compared theory on policy making in the developed world. Further case studies 
and applications of existing theory on policy making in the developing world would be useful in 
building this literature. 
In terms of South Africa's energy policy, there is a need for research on popular support for climate 
change mitigation strategies in order to better understand the potential for a legitimacy crisis 
undermining the existing regime, whether through the ANC or through opponents harnessing 
popular sentiment The government White Paper on Climate Change is being prepared at the time of 
completing this study and further research on the response to the public's input could indicate the 
extent to which the government will move on the issue. Government is due to release its Integrated 
Energy Plan, which ideally should have been released prior to the development of the IRP 2010. A 
study of this policy, once released, and its comparison to previous energy policies, such as the 1998 
white paper, will give further insight into change in South Africa's energy paradigm and dominant 
regime. 
In contrast to this, further research is needed on high value public procurement of nuclear 
electricity. The literature on nuclear electricity procurement needs to be developed, given its 
expected inclusion in South Africa's future electricity generating capacity. It is a particularly 
expensive and secretive area of public procurement, given the dangers it carries, and is therefore 
highly susceptible to corruption. 
There is also room for a comparative study in developing world energy policy, particularly the 
major developing economies such as China India, Brazil and South Africa. Such a study could 
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compare how policy is made in these countries, revealing their energy paradigms and potential for 
change. This could be particularly useful in understanding their strategies at international climate 
change mitigation negotiations. 
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Appendix 1 
National Enel'l!V BiD Public Heariu 30-31 July 2008 
Orr:anisation prim~. business Paradil!:m 1 2 3 4 N/A 
Business 
Eskom state owned enterprise 1 
PetroSA state owned enterprise 1 
Subtotals 
2 0 2 0 0 
Civil SocietvINGOs! Private citizensllobbv I!:roups 
Paraffin Safety Association safety lobby stron2 
Wessa Environmental NGO strong 
Renewable Enel'Jl:Y Workin2 Group Civil society strong 
Chamber of Mines mining lobby weak 
Electricity Intensive User Group energy lobby 1 
Sustainable Enel'Jl:Y Africa Sustainable energy NGO StroBl! 
Centre for applied leaal studies! EarthLife Africa Johannesburg LegallEnvironmental NGO stron2 
National Union ofMineworkerslCosatu Union 1 
Pelindaba Working Group Civil society strong 
Church based environmental 
SAFCEI civil society 1 
Ryan Donnelly private individual weak 
Matroosfontein Civic Association civil society Inaccessible 
South African Climate Action Network NGOnetwork inaccessible 
Subtotals: 
13 0 3 8 2 
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ucr Energy Research Centre Academic research weak 
Subtotals 
1 0 0 1 0 
1 weak 
Government bodies 
SANERI government research body weak 
Nersa energy regulator 1 
Subtotals 
2 0 1 1 0 
1 weak 
Totals 
18 6 10 2 
Reference 
All submissions accessed through the Parliamentary Monitoring Group and are available at http://www.pmg.org.zalreportl20080731-public-hearings-national-energy-biU-b52-2008 
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Appendix 2 
IRP2010 Stak h Id PI e 0 er enary s esslon 7-8J 2 une 010 
Business 
Ol"Eanisation Primary business Paradigm 1 2 3 4 
Sappi Paper producer 1 
Alstom electrical engineering firm 1 
Biotherm Energy renewable energy developer weak 
Blackharverst Trading energy efficient appliance trader weak 
Clean Energy Solutions renewable energy provider weak 
Exxaro coal miner 1 
iGas state owned gas firm 1 
Mainstream renewable power wind and solar electricity provider 1 
Mbani Wesizwe sustainable energy investment firm weak 
Necsa state owned nuclear researCh firm 1 
RES Renewable electricity producers weak 
Smart Green Prosperity renewable energy firm strong 
Tongaat Hullett Sugar producer/renewable energy stroDJ:!; 
Umoya Energy renewable electricity developer 1 
Vestas wind electricity producer 1 
Subtotals 
15 0 8 7 0 
5 weak 
2 strong 
Civil Society/ NGOslPrivate individuals and lobby groups 
Business Unity South Africa business lobby group 1 
Climate Justice Now Western Cape civil society network weak 
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Electricity Intensive User Group industrial electricity users lobby 1 
EarthLife Africa environmental NGO strong 
Energy Caucus civil society network . weak 
Idasa political NGO strong 
Koeberg Alert Alliance anti nuclear civil society strong 
Niasa . nuclear industry lobby 1 
SAFCEI church based environmental civil society 1 
SASTELA solar electricity lobby 1 
SAWEA wind electricity lobby weak 
Sustainable Energy Africa Sustainable energy NGO weak 
WWF environmental NGO strong 
subtotals 




Dave Long IES Energy sustainability consultant 1 
Alison Hughes UCT Energy Research Centre Academic strong 
Mark Pickering Meridian Economics infrastructure consultant weak 
Quartile Capital financial services weak 
Subtotals 




32 14 18 
11 weak 
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All submissions accessed through Department of Energy website 
and are available at http://www.energy.gov.za/IRP/hearingl.html 
Appendix 3 























renewable energy producer 
renewable energy consultancy 
solar enel'2Y provider 
renewable eneJ'2Y systems 
renewable energy provider 
renewable energy provider 
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Exxaro Mining 1 
G7 Renewable energies renewable energy developer 1 
Smart green prosperity renewable energy S strong 
Mainstream renewable power renewable energy developer 1 
Necsa Nuclear consultant 1 
Sol Africa thermal energy provider 1 
Tangent Mining Mining strong 
Westinghouse Electricty nuclear provider 1 
China Guandong Nuclear nuclear provider 1 
Clean Enrgy Projects renewable energy 1 
Renewable energy and efficiency 
East London IDZl Langa Energy consultant 1 
EDFEnergy renewable energy provider 1 
Eskom electricity producer inaccessible 
iGas LPG provider 1 
Sappi(Johannesbu~) Paper producers 1 
Subtotals: 
32 0 20 5 0 7 
3 weak 
2 strong 
Civil SocietylNGOs! Pvt individuals! Lobby ErouPS 
Anti Privatisation Forum Civil Society 1 
Dieter Holm Pvt strong 
EarthLife Africa Johannesburg Environmental NGO weak 
Greenpeace Environmental NGO weak 
Idasa Political NGO strong 
Niasa nuclear lobby group 1 
Renewable Energy Centre EnergyNGO 1 
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SAIPPA IPPLobby 1 
SAWEA wind energy lobby 1 
WWF Environmental NGO strong 
Chamber of Mines Mining lobby 1 
Climate Justice Now Civil Society weak 
Electricity Intensive User Group Industry lobby 1 
Federation for a sustainable environment environmental NGO federation not specifiable 
Fossil Fuel Foundation Energy Lobby 1 
GENSA gender and energy NGO strong 
MamaEarth Foundation Environmental Lobby weak 
Off the ground Foundation weak 
South African Council of Churches (Johannesburg) Civil Society religious 1 
SAFCEI (Johannesburg) Civil Society religious 1 
SASTELA Solar Industry Lobby I 
Youth in Climate Change Forum Youth environmental NGO weak 
Cape Chamber of Commerce Business lobby strong 
Idasa(Cape Town) democracy NGO not specifiable 
Koeberg Allert Alliance Civil society weak 
Project 90*230 environmental awareness project inaccessible 
South African Council of Churches (Cape Town) religious civil society 1 
SAFCEI (Cape Town) Church based environmental civil society 1 
SAPVIA Solar photovoltaic lobby Inaccessible 
Sustainable Energy Africa Inaccessible 
Worcester Business Forum Inaccessible 
Ecopeace environmental civil society weak 
EarthLife Africa Durban environmental NGO strong 
Geasphere environmental lobby strong 
Pamsa paper industry lobby I 
SAFCEI (Durban) Church based environmental civil society I 
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South African Sugar Association Sugar industry lobby 1 
Subtotals: 
37 0 16 15 0 6 
8 weak 
7strollK 
Academics and consultants 
Energy Institute Cape Peninsula University of 
Technology academic 1 
Energy Research Centre University of Cape Town academic inaccessible 
David Long IES Energy sustainabiIity consultant 1 
Dr David Fig ucr Academic weak 
Mike Deats former Eskom senior manager 1 
North West University academic not specifiable 
Standard Bank financial services not specifiable 
TedBlom management consultant not specifiable 
Subtotals: 




SALGA local government strong 
City of Cape Town municipality weak 
Greenscape Western Cape govt agency 1 
Subtotals: 
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